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Abstract—Recently, a secrecy measure based on list-
reconstruction has been proposed [2], in which a wiretapper
is allowed to produce a list of 2mRL reconstruction sequences
and the secrecy is measured by the minimum distortion over the
entire list. In this paper, we show that this list secrecy problem is
equivalent to the one with secrecy measured by a new quantity
lossy-equivocation, which is proven to be the minimum optimistic
1-achievable source coding rate (the minimum coding rate needed
to reconstruct the source within target distortion with positive
probability for infinitely many blocklengths) of the source with
the wiretapped signal as two-sided information, and also can
be seen as a lossy extension of conventional equivocation. Upon
this (or list) secrecy measure, we study source-channel secrecy
problem in the discrete memoryless Shannon cipher system with
noisy wiretap channel. Two inner bounds and an outer bound
on the achievable region of secret key rate, list rate, wiretapper
distortion, and distortion of legitimate user are given. The inner
bounds are derived by using uncoded scheme and (operationally)
separate scheme, respectively. Thanks to the equivalence between
lossy-equivocation secrecy and list secrecy, information spectrum
method is leveraged to prove the outer bound. As special cases,
the admissible region for the case of degraded wiretap channel or
lossless communication for legitimate user has been characterized
completely. For both these two cases, separate scheme is proven
to be optimal. Interestingly, however, separation indeed suffers
performance loss for other certain cases. Besides, we also extend
our results to characterize the achievable region for Gaussian
communication case. As a side product optimistic lossy source
coding has also been addressed.
Index Terms—Shannon cipher system, source-channel secrecy,
lossy-equivocation, wiretap channel, optimistic coding, informa-
tion spectrum method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon cipher system (the one with noisy channel depicted
in Fig. 1) was first investigated by Shannon [3], in which a
sender A communicates with a legitimate receiver B secretly
by exploiting a secret key that is shared by them. Shannon
showed that the perfect secrecy for this system is achievable
if and only if the rate of secret key is not smaller than the
entropy of the source. However in practice, the amount of key
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may be insufficient, and the wiretapper might only want to
reconstruct a lossy version of the source. Recently, Schieler et
al. [2] proposed a distortion-based secrecy measure around
the assumption that the wiretapper has ability to conduct
list decoding with fixed list size, and the induced distortion
is set to the minimum distortion over the entire list. They
studied it in the Shannon cipher system with noiseless channel,
and characterized the optimal tradeoff of secret key rate,
list rate, wiretapper distortion, and distortion of legitimate
user. For this secrecy measure, the wiretapper can be seen
as a “guessing wiretapper” who produces a list of guesses to
reconstruct the source within target distortion (suppose some
testing mechanism is available at the wiretapper). From the
perspective of computational security, the list size indicates
the computational complexity that the wiretapper needs to
reconstruct the source within target distortion (different from
[4] the number of guesses for list secrecy is fixed during the
guessing process). On the other hand, from the perspective
of information-theoretic security, the minimum list rate also
indicates the minimum additional information rate (received
from an omniscient helper, named henchman) for the wire-
tapper to reconstruct the source within target distortion [2].
Besides, this secrecy measure is also compatible with the
conventional equivocation, and actually it can be characterized
by lossy-equivocation, a lossy extension of the conventional
equivocation (this point will be shown in this paper). Fur-
thermore, this kind of measure could apply to any secrecy
system (not restricted to lossy communication system or the
secrecy system with testing mechanism at the wiretapper),
such as secure multimedia communication, communication of
personal verification information (password or bank account),
and communication of any other classified database that con-
sists of sensitive information. This is because on one hand, the
results in [2] still hold for lossless communication case; and
on the other hand, the interpretation from the perspective of
information-theoretic security is always valid for any secrecy
system.
The secrecy measure in [2] is defined in sense of strong
secrecy, which requires that there exists no sequence of codes
achieving target distortion for all sufficiently large block-
lengths. It implies the supremum of achievable list rate equals
the infimum of all R for which there exists a sequence of
R-rate codes achieving target distortion for infinitely many
blocklengths. This kind of codes is related to optimistic coding,
which requires that good codes exist for infinitely many block-
lengths as opposed to for all sufficiently large blocklengths,
required by the (pessimistic) source coding or channel coding.
Optimistic source coding and optimistic channel coding are
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2originated from the study of the source-channel separation
theorem and strong converse for general sources and channels
[5], [6], and then systematically investigated by Chen et al. as
a separate problem [7]. Recently, Tan et al. [18] applied the
optimistic coding to the secure communication over wiretap
channels, and studied the optimistic capacity of legitimate
user under given secrecy constraint. However, in this paper,
it is used to study the secrecy performance, instead of the
communication performance of legitimate user.
Furthermore, some researchers investigated source-channel
secrecy problem. Yamamoto [10] studied it in Shannon cipher
system with secrecy measured by the minimum distortion that
incurs in reconstructing the source for a wiretapper. A different
formulation of the problem was considered in [12], where
the authors assumed there is a fixed information leakage to
the wiretapper and wish to minimize the distortion at the
legitimate receiver, while at the same time providing a graceful
distortion degradation when there is an SNR (Signal Noise
Ratio) mismatch. They showed that, for a positive leakage,
this can be achieved by combining vector quantization and
scaling together. This scenario was extended to consider side
information at the receiver in [13] or side information at the
sender in [14]. Besides, joint source-channel secrecy with
noncausal side information available at both the legitimate user
and the eavesdropper has been studied in [15], and with causal
source disclosure at the eavesdropper has been studied in [16].
In this paper, the list secrecy measure proposed in [2] is
applied to the source-channel secrecy problem for Shannon
cipher system with a discrete memoryless source transmitted
over a discrete memoryless noisy wiretap channel (see Fig. 1),
and then we investigate the the achievable region of secret key
rate, list rate, wiretapper distortion, and distortion of legitimate
user for this system. The secrecy of the system is obtained
by exploiting both the secret key and the wiretap channel.
By information spectrum analysis, we find that this problem
(or an equivalent problem, henchman problem) is equivalent
to the one with secrecy measured by a new quantity, lossy-
equivocation, which is defined as a conditional rate-distortion
function obtained by extending conventional equivocation
(conditional entropy) to the lossy case. From perspective of
optimistic source coding, the lossy-equivocation is proven to
be the minimum optimistic 1-achievable source coding rate
(the minimum coding rate to achieve target distortion with
positive probability for infinitely many blocklengths) of the
source with the wiretapped signal as two-sided information.
Thanks to the equivalence between lossy-equivocation secrecy
and list secrecy, it enables us to leverage the information
spectrum method to analyze these problems and obtain a
converse result. Note that this proof method is different from
the one used in [2] which mainly relies on the method of
types. Besides, two achievability schemes, uncoded scheme
and (operationally) separate scheme, are analyzed. When spe-
cialized to lossless communication case or degraded wiretap
channel case, the separate scheme is proven to be optimal.
Hence for these cases, the admissible regions are characterized
completely. Interestingly, however, we observe that separate
scheme indeed loses the optimality for other certain cases.
This implies separation is not optimal in general for the source-
channel secrecy problem.
Besides, we extend our result to characterize the achiev-
able region for the Gaussian communication case. Since the
standard discretization technique, usually used in proving the
achievability for the continuous source or continuous channel,
is invalid in bounding the probability of excess distortion,
some other techniques including d−tilted information, weak
typicality, and specified discretization, are exploited in our
proof.
In our work, optimistic source coding plays a key role in
building a bridge between the list secrecy problem and the
lossy-equivocation secrecy problem. Optimistic lossless source
coding was investigated by Chen et al. [7]. As an extension to
lossy case, optimistic lossy source coding has been addressed
in this paper as a side product.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
summarizes basic notations, preliminaries, and formulation of
the problem. Section III and Section IV give the main results
for the discrete memoryless systems of lossless communica-
tion and lossy communication, respectively. Section V extends
the results to quadratic Gaussian communication scenario.
Finally, Section VI gives the concluding remarks.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation and Preliminaries
We use PX(x) to denote the probability distribution of
random variable X , which is also shortly denoted as PX or
P (x). We also use PX and QX to denote different probability
distribution with common alphabet X .
The total variation distance between two probability mea-
sures P and Q with common alphabet is defined by
‖P −Q‖TV , sup
A∈F
|P (A)−Q(A)|, (1)
where F is the σ-algebra of the probability space. The
following properties of total variation distance hold.
Property 1. [2] Total variation distance satisfies:
1) If the support of P and Q is a countable set X , then
‖P −Q‖TV = 1
2
∑
x∈X
|P ({x})−Q({x})|. (2)
2) Let ε > 0 and let f(x) be a function with bounded range
of width b > 0. Then
‖P −Q‖TV < ε =⇒
∣∣EP f(X)−EQf(X)∣∣ < εb, (3)
where EP indicates that the expectation is taken with
respect to the distribution P .
3) Let PXPY |X and QXPY |X be two joint distributions
with common channel PY |X . Then
‖PXPY |X −QXPY |X‖TV = ‖PX −QX‖TV . (4)
3Information spectrum analysis [11] will be used frequently
in this paper. For a general sequence of random variables B =
{Bn}n∈N1, define
p-lim inf
n→∞
Bn,sup
{
r : lim
n→∞P(Bn < r)=0
}
(5)
and
p-lim sup
n→∞
Bn, inf
{
r : lim
n→∞P(Bn > r)=0
}
. (6)
For any general pair of random variables (U,V) with joint
distribution PUV , {PUnV n}n∈N, define, for each n, the
normalized information density random variables2
ın(U
n;V n) , 1
n
log
PV n|Un(V n|Un)
PV n(V n)
. (7)
Given {ın(Un;V n)}n∈N, we may now define
I(U; V) , p-lim inf
n→∞
ın(U
n;V n) (8)
I(U; V) , p-lim sup
n→∞
ın(U
n;V n). (9)
In information spectrum analysis, I(U; V) and I(U; V) are
termed the spectral inf- and sup-mutual information rates re-
spectively. They are respectively the p-lim inf and p-lim sup
of the sequence of random variables {ın(Un;V n)}n∈N. As
special cases, spectral inf- and sup-entropy rates are defined
as
H(U) , p-lim inf
n→∞
ın(U
n;Un) (10)
H(U) , p-lim sup
n→∞
ın(U
n;Un). (11)
The conditional versions of these quantities can be defined
similarly, which will be used in the latter sections as well. Fur-
thermore, for any sequence of distortion functions dn(un, vn),
define
D(U,V) , p-lim inf
n→∞
dn(U
n, V n) (12)
D(U,V) , p-lim sup
n→∞
dn(U
n, V n). (13)
B. List Secrecy
Consider Shannon cipher system with noisy wiretap channel
shown in Fig. 1, where a sender A and a legitimate receiver
B share a secret key K that is uniformly distributed over[
2mRK
]
3 and independent of a source Sm. The sender A
observes the discrete memoryless (DM) source sequence Sm
with each element i.i.d. (independent and identically dis-
tributed) according to PS , and then transmits it to the legiti-
mate user B over a DM wiretap channel PY Z|X confidentially
by utilizing the secret key and the wiretap channel. Finally, the
legitimate user B produces a source reconstruction Sˆm using
the received sequence Y n and the secret key K.
1Throughout this paper, we use the boldface to denote a sequence of random
variables, e.g., B = {Bn}n∈N. Note that the alphabets of these random
variables are not restricted to be Cartesian product, and the information
spectrum quantities defined in this subsection will be applied for sequences
of random variables of different length in the latter sections.
2For convenience, all log’s and exp’s in this paper are with respect to base
2.
3In this paper, the set {1, ..., l} is sometimes denoted by [l].
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Fig. 1. Shannon cipher system with noisy wiretap channel.
Definition 1. An (m,n,RK) block code consists of4
1) Stochastic encoder: PXn|SmK : Sm ×
[
2mRK
] 7→ Xn;
2) Decoder: ψ : Yn × [2mRK ] 7→ Sˆm.
Assume the source sample rate is Bs and the channel sample
rate is Bc. Define the bandwidth mismatch factor as γ , BcBs .
Then for any (m,n,RK) block code that can be implemented
in the system with bandwidth mismatch factor γ, it must hold
that nm ≤ γ. Note that any (m,n′, RK) code with n
′
m ≤ γ can
be seen as a special case of (m,n,RK) codes with n = bmγc5
in which for each block, only n′ channel symbols are used.
Hence for the system with bandwidth mismatch factor γ, we
only need consider (m,n,RK) codes with n = bmγc.
Another output Zn of the channel is accessed by a wire-
tapper Eve. Based on Zn, the wiretapper produces a list
L(Zn) ⊆ Sˇm and the induced distortion is set to the minimum
one over the entire list, i.e., minsˇm∈L(Zn) dE(Sm, sˇm), where
dE (s
m, sˇm) , 1m
∑m
i=1 dE (si, sˇi) is a distortion measure for
the wiretapper. For given distortion levels DB and DE , by
exploiting the secret key and the wiretap channel, Nodes A
and B want to communicate the source within distortion DB ,
while ensuring that the wiretapper’s strategy always suffers
distortion above DE with high probability.
Definition 2. The tuple (RK , RL, DB , DE) is achievable if
there exists a sequence of (m,n,RK) codes with n = bmγc
such that ∀δ > 0,
1) Distortion constraint:
lim
m→∞P
[
dB(S
m, Sˆm) ≤ DB + δ
]
= 1, (14)
where dB (sm, sˆm) , 1m
∑m
i=1 dB (si, sˆi) is a distortion
measure for the legitimate user B;
2) Secrecy constraint:
lim
m→∞P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≥ DE − δ
]
= 1 (15)
for any sequence of lists {Lm} such that
lim supm→∞
1
m log |Lm| ≤ RL, where Sˇm =
arg minsˇm∈Lm(Zn) dE(S
m, sˇm).
It is easy to verify that in Definition 2, the constraints 1)
and 2) can be respectively replaced with DB(S, Sˆ) ≤ DB ,
and DE(S, Sˇ) ≥ DE for any sequence of lists such that
lim supm→∞
1
m log |Lm| ≤ RL.
4Similar to [8], it can be shown that one cannot benefit from replacing the
decoder with a stochastic one.
5Here bxc denotes the maximum integer not larger than x
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Fig. 2. Henchman problem, where lim supm→∞Rm ≤ RL.
Definition 3. The admissible region R ,
Closure {Achievable (RK , RL, DB , DE)}6.
We assume all the alphabets of the source and its recon-
structions (at the legitimate user or wiretapper), as well as the
alphabets of channel input and outputs, are finite.
C. Henchman Problem
The problem above is equivalent to a henchman problem
[2], in which a wiretapper reconstructs a single sequence with
the help of a rate-limited henchman who can access to both the
source Sm and the wiretapped signal Zn. As depicted in Fig.
2, the wiretapper receives the best possible mRm bits from
the henchman to assist in producing a reconstruction sequence
Sˇm.
Definition 4. The Rm-rate henchman code of an (m,n,RK)
block code consists of
1) Encoder: ϕH : Sm ×Zn 7→
[
2mRm
]
;
2) Decoder: ψH :
[
2mRm
]×Zn 7→ Sˇm.
We assume that the wiretapper and henchman are aware
of the (m,n,RK) block code adopted by Nodes A and B,
and they cooperate to design a henchman code based on the
(m,n,RK) block code.
Definition 5. The tuple (RK , RL, DB , DE) is achievable
in the henchman problem if there exists a sequence of
(m,n,RK) codes with n = bmγc such that
1) Distortion constraint: DB(S, Sˆ) ≤ DB ;
2) Secrecy constraint: DE(S, Sˇ) ≥ DE for any sequence of
henchman codes such that lim supm→∞Rm ≤ RL, where
Rm’s are the rates of henchman codes.
D. Lossy-Equivocation Secrecy
Besides, the list secrecy problem and the henchman problem
also can be formulated as a secure communication problem
with secrecy measured by lossy-equivocation.
Definition 6. For a general source S, general two-sided
information Z, and a general distortion measure dE (sm, sˇm),
6The admissible region R does not change if we replace the constraint
lim supm→∞
1
m
log |Lm| ≤ RL of Definition 2 with 1m log |Lm| ≤ RL
for all m. This is because it only affects the achievability of the points on the
boundary of R, and however, R is defined as a closed set (all the boundary
points are incorporated into it). To keep consistent with the standard formu-
lation of rate constraint in [11], here we write lim supm→∞
1
m
log |Lm| ≤
RL, instead of the other one.
the (spectral inf-) lossy-equivocation (or rate-distortion based
spectral inf-equivocation) RS|Z(DE) is defined as
RS|Z(DE) , inf
PSˇ|SZ:DE(S,Sˇ)≤DE
I(S; Sˇ|Z) (16)
for DE ≥ DE,min , infg(s)DE(S,g (S)), where
g (s) denotes a sequence of functions {gm (sm)}m∈N; and
RS|Z(DE) , +∞ for DE < DE,min.
In the lossy-equivocation secrecy problem, a sender and a
legitimate user jointly design an (m,n,RK) block code to
maximize the lossy-equivocation.
Definition 7. The tuple (RK , RL, DB , DE) is achievable if
there exists a sequence of (m,n,RK) codes with n = bmγc
such that
1) Distortion constraint: DB(S, Sˆ) ≤ DB ;
2) Secrecy constraint: RL ≤ RS|Z(DE).
Besides, by setting dB(sm, sˆm) = 1 {sm 6= sˆm} and DB =
0, the achievable tuples and admissible region for lossless
communication can be defined similarly7.
Definition 8. The tuple (RK , RL, DE) is achievable for loss-
less communication if there exists a sequence of (m,n,RK)
codes with n = bmγc such that limm→∞ P(Sm 6= Sˆm) = 0,
and the secrecy constraint in Definition 2, 5 or 7 holds. The
admissible region R , Closure {Achievable (RK , RL, DE)}
for this case.
Observe that the secrecy constraint in Definition 5 requires
that DE cannot be achieved (with any positive probability) by
any sequence of RL-rate henchman codes for all sufficiently
large blocklengths. By contrapositive, the supremum of all RL
satisfying the secrecy constraint equals the infimum of all R
for which there exists a sequence of R-rate codes achieving
DE (with some positive probability) for infinitely many block-
lengths. This is related to optimistic source coding, which
requires that good codes exist for infinitely many blocklengths
as opposed to for all sufficiently large blocklengths, required
by the (pessimistic) source coding. Hence the supremum of
RL also equals the infimum of all R for which there exists
a sequence of R-rate optimistic source codes achieving DE .
This enables us to apply optimistic source coding to analyzing
the henchman problem.
The information spectrum characterization of optimistic
lossy source coding is given in the following theorem, the
proof of which is presented in Appendix A. To state our results
concisely, for a general sequence of random variables U,V
and a sequence of distortion measures dm(um, vm), we define
D(ε)(U,V) , inf
{
d : lim inf
m→∞ P
[
dm(U
m, V m) ≥ d
]
< ε
}
.
(17)
Note that D(ε)(U,V) is consistent with D(U,V) when ε = 1,
i.e., D(1)(U,V) = D(U,V).
7Furthermore, by setting dE(sm, sˇm) = 1 {sm 6= sˇm} and DE = 0, the
admissible region for losslessly reconstructing the source at the wiretapper
can be defined as well. By checking our proof, it can be verified that the
admissible region for this case is the same as that obtained by specializing
our result to the case of dE(sm, sˇm) = 1m
∑m
i=1 1 {si 6= sˇi} and DE = 0.
5Theorem 1 (Optimistic ε-Achievable Source Coding). Given
a general source S and general two-sided information Z,
and a general distortion measure dE (sm, sˇm), there exists a
sequence of Rm-rate fixed-length source codes (fm, gm)
∞
m=1
such that
lim sup
m→∞
Rm ≤ R, (18)
D
(ε)
E (S, Sˇ) ≤ DE , (19)
(these codes are named optimistic ε-achievable source codes;
see [7]) with Sˇm , gm(fm(Sm, Zn), Zn) denoting the
reconstruction, if and only if
R ≥ R(ε)S|Z(DE) , inf
PS˜|SZ:D
(ε)
E (S,S˜)≤DE
I(S; S˜|Z). (20)
Remark 1. When ε = 1, D(1)E (S, Sˇ) = DE(S, Sˇ). Hence
RS|Z(DE) = R
(1)
S|Z(DE), i.e., RS|Z(DE) is the minimum op-
timistic 1-achievable source coding rate (the minimum coding
rate such that DE(S, Sˇ) ≤ DE).
Chen et al. have shown that H(S|Z) is the minimum
optimistic 1-achievable source coding rate for lossless case
(minimum source coding rate for the source S and two-sided
information Z such that lim infm→∞ P(Sm 6= Sˇm) < 1) [7].
By Remark 1, and the operational definitions of optimistic 1-
achievability for both lossless and lossy cases, we have the
following proposition. Besides, to understand this proposition
more intuitively, a direct proof is also given in Appendix B.
Proposition 1. For a general source S, general two-
sided information Z, and a general distortion measure
dE (s
m, sˇm), RS|Z(DE) ≤ H(S|Z) for DE ≥ D′E,min ,
infg(s)DE(S,g (S)). Moreover, RS|Z(DE) = H(S|Z) for
dE(s
m, sˇm) = 1 {sm 6= sˇm} and DE = 0.
Remark 2. For a DM source S with finite alphabet and an ad-
ditive distortion measure dE (sm, sˇm) = 1m
∑m
i=1 dE (si, sˇi),
we have DE,min = D′E,min = inf sˇ(s) EdE(S, sˇ (S)), where
DE,min is given in Definition 6. Hence for this case,
RS|Z(DE) ≤ H(S|Z) for any DE ≥ DE,min.
It seems somewhat counterintuitive that as the opti-
mistic 1-achievable source coding rate, the lossy equivoca-
tion RS|Z(DE) (and also R
(ε)
S|Z(DE)), is defined via sup-
conditional mutual information rate, but in [7], the lossless
optimistic 1-achievable rate H(S|Z) is characterized by inf-
entropy rate (instead of sup-entropy rate). For the case of
dE(s
m, sˇm) = 1 {sm 6= sˇm} and DE = 0, DE(S, Sˇ) ≤ DE
is equivalent to lim infm→∞ P(Sm 6= Sˇm) < 1. Hence for
this case, Proposition 1 implies RS|Z(DE) = H(S|Z) =
infPSˇ|SZ:lim infm→∞ P(Sm 6=Sˇm)<1 I(S; Sˇ|Z). That is, H(S|Z)
can be characterized by sup-conditional mutual information
rate as well.
Due to Proposition 1, the quantity H(S|Z) can be also
named as spectral inf-equivocation (or conditional spectral
inf-entropy). This term is closely related to the conventional
equivocation lim infm→∞H(Sm|Zn). Both of them denote
conditional entropies, but the former is defined in sense of
limit inferior in probability, and the latter is defined in sense
of expectation. Moreover, H(S|Z) ≤ lim infm→∞H(Sm|Zn)
holds in general.
Comparing the secrecy constraint of Definition 5 with
(18) and (19) tells us that given source Sm and two-sided
information Zn, the minimum optimistic 1-achievable source
coding rate equals the supremum of all RL satisfying the
secrecy constraint. Hence Theorem 1 combined with Remark
1 implies the equivalence between the lossy-equivocation
secrecy problem and the henchman problem.On the other
hand, the equivalence between the list secrecy problem and
the henchman problem has been proven by Schieler and Cuff
[2, Prop. 1]. Hence these three problems are equivalent to each
other, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The tuple (RK , RL + δ1, DB , DE + δ1)
for some δ1 > 0 is achievable for lossy communi-
cation (or (RK , RL + δ1, DE + δ1) for lossless commu-
nication) in the list secrecy problem if and only if
(RK , RL + δ2, DB , DE + δ2) for some δ2 > 0 is achiev-
able in the henchman problem, and also if and only if
(RK , RL + δ3, DB , DE + δ3) for some δ3 > 0 is achievable
in the lossy-equivocation secrecy problem. In other words,
the admissible region R remains the same for these three
problems.
Proof: Schieler and Cuff [2, Prop. 1] have shown that for
any tuple (RK , RL, DB , DE), the achievability is equivalent
for the list secrecy problem and the henchman problem. Hence
we only need to show that (RK , RL + δ2, DB , DE + δ2) for
some δ2 > 0 is achievable in the henchman problem, if and
only if (RK , RL + δ3, DB , DE + δ3) for some δ3 > 0 is
achievable in the lossy-equivocation secrecy problem.
Suppose that the tuple (RK , RL + δ2, DB , DE + δ2) sat-
isfies the secrecy constraint: DE(S, Sˇ) ≥ DE + δ2 for any
sequence of henchman codes such that lim supm→∞Rm ≤
RL + δ2. It immediately gives us DE(S, Sˇ) > DE + δ22 for
any sequence of codes such that lim supm→∞Rm ≤ RL+δ2.
By Theorem 1 together with Remark 1, we have RL + δ2 <
RS|Z(DE + δ22 ). Hence (RK , RL + δ3, DB , DE + δ3) with
δ3 =
δ2
2 > 0 is achievable in the lossy-equivocation secrecy
problem.
Suppose that the tuple (RK , RL + δ3, DB , DE + δ3) satis-
fies the secrecy constraint: RL+δ3 ≤ RS|Z(DE+δ3). It imme-
diately gives us RL+ δ32 < RS|Z(DE+δ3). Again, by Theorem
1 together with Remark 1, we have DE(S, Sˇ) ≥ DE + δ3 for
any sequence of codes such that lim supm→∞Rm ≤ RL+ δ32 .
Hence (RK , RL + δ2, DB , DE + δ2) with δ2 = δ32 > 0 is
achievable in the henchman problem.
Therefore, the achievability of
(RK , RL + δ2, DB , DE + δ2) for the henchman
problem is equivalent to the achievability of
(RK , RL + δ3, DB , DE + δ3) for the lossy-equivocation
secrecy problem.
So far, we have shown that the achievability of the interior
points of R is equivalent for these three problems. On the
other hand, R is defined as a closed set. So the admissible
region R remains the same for these three problems.
From this proposition and Definition 7, the admissible re-
6gion for these problems can be characterized using information
spectrum quantities as
R = Closure
⋃
PX|SK,PSˆ|YK

(RK , RL, DB , DE) :
DB(S, Sˆ) ≤ DB ,
RL ≤ RS|Z(DE)
 . (21)
In addition to the DM system, we also consider the Shan-
non cipher system of communicating Gaussian source over
power-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel. For this case,
the channel input cost constraint
lim
n→∞P
[
ρ (Xn) ≤ P + δ] = 1,∀δ > 0, (22)
should be added to Definitions 2, 5 and 7, where ρ (xn) ,
1
n
∑n
i=1 ρ (xi) is cost function of the wiretap channel, and for
power-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel ρ (x) = x2. For
the system involving channel cost constraint, Proposition 2
still holds.
III. LOSSLESS COMMUNICATION
When lossless communication is required for the legitimate
user, the admissible region R is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 (Lossless Communication). For the lossless DM
Shannon cipher system, we have
R =
{
(RK , RL, DE) : γCB ≥ H (S) ,
RL ≤ min
{
RK + γΓ1(
1
γH(S)), RS(DE)
} }
,
(23)
where
CB = max
PX
I (X;Y ) (24)
denotes the capacity of the channel PY |X ,
Γ1 (R) , max
PXPV |XPU|V :
I(V ;Y )≥R,
I(U ;Y )≤I(U ;Z)
[I (V ;Y |U)− I (V ;Z|U)] (25)
denotes the equivocation-capacity function of the wiretap
channel which was first defined by Csisza´r et al. [9] and
RS (D) = min
PSˇ|S :EdE(S,Sˇ)≤D
I(S; Sˇ) (26)
denotes the rate-distortion function of S.
Remark 3. More precisely, the equivocation-capacity function
of the wiretap channel [9, Cor. 2] was defined as
Γ′1 (R) = min
{
R,Γ1 (R)
}
. (27)
However, for our problem, it does not affect the admis-
sible region R by replacing Γ1 (R) with Γ′1 (R), since if
Γ1 (R) > R then min
{
RK + γΓ
′
1(
1
γH(S)), RS(DE)
}
=
min
{
RK + γΓ1(
1
γH(S)), RS(DE)
}
= RS(DE).
Remark 4. If the secrecy measure is replaced with the
conventional equivocation lim infm→∞H(Sm|Zn), then the
admissible region becomes the R in (23) with the term
RS(DE) replaced by H (S). The achievability part of this
claim follows from the fact RS|Z(DE) ≤ H(S|Z) ≤
lim infm→∞H(Sm|Zn) and Theorem 2 with the setting
dE(s
m, sˇm) = 1m
∑m
i=1 1 {si 6= sˇi} and DE = 0; the converse
part of this claim can be shown by following similar steps to
the proof of the converse part of Theorem 2. Note that this
claim with RK = 0 is a restatement of the result of [9] with
common message rate R0 = 0, or the result of [8].
Proof: The proof of converse part is given in Appendix C.
As for the achievability part, lossless communication can be
roughly considered as a special case of lossy communication,
hence the achievability part can be obtained by following
similar steps to the proof of the achievability part of Theorem
3, which is stated in Section IV.
Note that the result for the case with no henchman (or only
a single reconstruction allowed) is obtained by setting RL = 0
in the region of Theorem 2. For this case, any positive rate of
secret key or any positive Γ1( 1γH(S)) results in the maximum
expected distortion that can occur. This observation coincides
with that for noiseless wiretap channel case [2].
The first constraint of R is consistent with the source-
channel separation theorem, and the second constraint of
R, roughly speaking, follows from the following argument.
On one hand, the henchman and the wiretapper can always
ignore the signal Zn and use a point-to-point code to achieve
RS(DE). On the other hand, the optimal strategy of the
sender and legitimate user is an operationally separate coding
scheme, in which the source is first compressed by an optimal
source code with rate H (S), then a part (RK rate) of the
resulting bitstream is encrypted by one-time pad using the
secret key, finally all the bitstream is transmitted losslessly
to the legitimate user using an optimal secrecy-channel code
[9]. The optimal secrecy-channel code consists of two layers
Un and V n, and the secrecy is obtained only from the
second layer, i.e., V n. For such optimal strategy, upon Zn the
wiretapper is able to reconstruct the first layer Un directly,
and further reconstruct V n upon both Zn and Un by using
rate γ (I (V ;Y |U)− I (V ;Z|U)). Then the wiretapper uses
RK rate to decrypt the secret key, and finally reconstructs the
source losslessly by using the secret key and the messages
(Un, V n) as the legitimate user does.
Furthermore, if the legitimate user’s channel is less noisy
than the wiretapper’s (i.e., for every V → X → Y Z,
I (V ;Y ) ≥ I (V ;Z) holds; see [17]), then Csisza´r et al. [9,
Thm. 3] showed
Γ1 (R) = max
PX :I(X;Y )≥R
[I (X;Y )− I (X;Z)] . (28)
IV. LOSSY COMMUNICATION
Now, we consider lossy communication case. Define
R(i)unc =
⋃
PXn|SmK

(RK , RL, DB , DE) :
DB ≥ minsˆm(yn,k) EdB
(
Sm, Sˆm
)
,
RL ≤ 1mRSm|Zn(DE)
 ,
R(i)sep =
⋃
PSˆ|S

(RK , RL, DB , DE) : γCB ≥ I(S; Sˆ),
DB ≥ EdB(S, Sˆ),
RL ≤ min
{
RK + γΓ1
(
1
γ I(S; Sˆ)
)
+RS|Sˆ(DE), RS(DE)
}
 ,
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R(o) =
⋃
PSˆ|S

(RK , RL, DB , DE) : γCB ≥ I(S; Sˆ),
DB ≥ EdB(S, Sˆ),
RL ≤ min
{
RK + γΓ2
(
1
γ I(S; Sˆ)
)
+RS|Sˆ(DE), RS(DE)
}
 ,
where CB , Γ1 (·) and RS (·) are respectively defined by (24),
(25) and (26),
Γ2 (R) , min
QY Z|X :QY |X=PY |X ,
QZ|X=PZ|X
max
QX :IQ(X;Y )≥R
IQ (X;Y |Z)
(29)
with IQ (·) denoting the mutual information under distribu-
tion QXQY Z|X , is another function specified by the wiretap
channel, and
RS|Sˆ (D) = min
PSˇ|SSˆ :EdE(S,Sˇ)≤D
I(S; Sˇ|Sˆ) (30)
denotes the rate-distortion function of S with the two-sided
information Sˆ. Then we have the following theorem for lossy
communication case.
Theorem 3 (Lossy Communication). For the lossy DM Shan-
non cipher system, we have
R(i)unc ∪R(i)sep ⊆ R ⊆ R(o). (31)
Remark 5. As shown in the following, R(i)unc is achieved by
an uncoded scheme. In this scheme, the secret key is used
in a symbol-by-symbol way. However, applying the key to a
sufficiently large blocklength will result in a better secrecy
performance. Based on this idea, an improved version of this
scheme is proposed in our another paper [20], which cascades
a random permutation (according to the secret key) with a
symbol-by-symbol mapping. We refer the interested reader to
[20] for the details.
Remark 6. Similar to Remark (4), if the secrecy
measure is replaced with the conventional equivocation
lim infm→∞H(Sm|Zn), then by replacing the terms
1
mRSm|Zn(DE), RS|Sˆ(DE) and RS(DE) with
1
mH(S
m|Zn),
H(S|Sˆ) and H (S), Theorem 3 still holds. The proof of this
claim follows similar argument to that of Remark (4). Note
that this claim with RK = 0 is a lossy extension of the result
of [9] with common message rate R0 = 0 and the result of
[8].
Proof: The proofs of the outer bound and the inner bound
R(i)sep are given in Appendices D and E, respectively. Now
we give a proof of the inner bound R(i)unc. For simplicity, we
only consider the case of m = n = 1. For given PX|SK ,
suppose sˆ (y, k) achieves minsˆ(y,k) EdB(S, Sˆ). Then consider
the following uncoded scheme.
Encoder: Upon (S,K), the sender produces X stochasti-
cally according to probability distribution PX|SK .
Decoder: The legitimate user produces Sˆ = sˆ (Y,K).
Observe that (Si,Ki, Xi, Yi, Zi, Sˆi)∞i=1 are i.i.d. Then by
law of large numbers,
P
[
dB(S
l, Sˆl) ≤ EdB(Sl, Sˆl) + 
]
l→∞−−−→ 1, (32)
for any  > 0. Hence the distortion constraint for legitimate
user is satisfied.
Next we prove the secrecy constraint is also satisfied
if RL < RS|Z(DE). That is, if RL < RS|Z(DE) then
liml→∞ P
(
dE(S
l, Sˇl) < DE − 
)
= 0 for any  > 0. This
is equivalent to the strong converse for lossy source coding
with two-sided information.
Define A , {(Sl, Zl) ∈ T lδ } . From the property of typi-
cality, we have P (A)→ 1 as l→∞. Denote the codebook of
henchman code as C. Given Zl, C has 2lRl elements at most.
Denote them as sˇl
(
i, zl
)
, i ∈ [2lRl ]. Consider
P
(
dE(S
l, Sˇl) < DE − 
)
≤P (dE(Sl, Sˇl) < DE − ,A)+ P (Ac) (33)
≤P (dE(Sl, Sˇl) < DE − ,A)+ l (34)
=
∑
zl
PZn,C
(
zl, c
)
P
(
dE(S
l, Sˇl) < DE − ,A|zl, c
)
+ l,
(35)
where l is a term that vanishes as l → ∞. Utilizing union
bound, we have
P
(
dE(S
l, Sˇl) < DE − ,A|zl, c
)
≤
∑
i∈[2lRl ]
P
(
dE(S
m, sˇm
(
i, zl
)
) < DE − ,A|zl, c
)
. (36)
On the other hand, Lemma 10 (given in Appendix
E) implies P
(
dE(S
m, sˇm
(
i, zl
)
) < DE − ,A|zl, c
) ≤
2−l(RS|Z(DE−)−o(1)) ≤ 2−l(RS|Z(DE)−o(1)). Then combining
it with (35) and (36), we have
P
(
dE(S
l, Sˇl) < DE − 
)
≤2−l(RS|Z(DE)−Rl−o(1)) + l. (37)
If RL < RS|Z(DE), i.e., lim supl→∞Rl < RS|Z(DE), then
P
(
dE(S
l, Sˇl) < DE − 
) l→∞−−−→ 0, (38)
for any  > 0. Hence (RK , RL, DB , DE) is achievable.
Note that R(i)sep is a generalization of the achievability part of
Theorem 2 to the lossy case, and obtained by an operationally
separate scheme as well. R(i)unc is achieved by the uncoded
scheme above in which both the encoder and decoder are
symbol-by-symbol mappings. Different from the lossless case,
for the lossy communication the source may be transmitted
using uncoded scheme or other lossy joint source-channel
secrecy code, and hence there may be no message (digital
information) transmitted over the channel. For this case the
wiretapper cannot decrypt the source through decrypting the
digital information. This leads to the difficulty for proving
the outer bound part. Here we leverage information spectrum
method to derive the outer bound. Instead of reconstructing the
source directly, an indirect decryption strategy is considered
in our proof, which can be roughly considered as follows:
the wiretapper first reconstructs Sˆn using rate γΓ2
(
1
γ I(S; Sˆ)
)
,
next decrypts the secret key using rate RK , then upon Y n and
secret key, produces the legitimate user’s reconstruction Sˆn,
and finally upon Sˆn produces a final reconstruction Sˇn using
rate RS|Sˆ(DE). This leads to the outer bound R(o).
8Note that R(o) and R(i)sep differ only in the gamma functions
Γ1 (·) and Γ2 (·). Obviously, Γ1 (·) and Γ2 (·) both only
depend on the margin distributions of the wiretap channel, and
Γ1 (R) ≤ Γ2 (R), or equivalently, R(i)sep ⊆ R(o). Moreover for
(stochastically) degraded wiretap channel, it is easy to verify
that Γ1 (R) = Γ2 (R). Hence for this case, R(i)sep and R(o)
coincide.
Theorem 4 (DM System with Degraded Wiretap Channel).
For lossy DM Shannon cipher system with a degraded wiretap
channel (X → Y → Z or X → Z → Y ), we have
R = R(i)sep = R(o). (39)
Theorem 4 implies the separate coding is optimal for the
degraded channel case. However, this is not true in general.
In fact, as illustrated by the following example, there exists
some source-channel pair such that uncoded scheme strictly
outperforms separate scheme. This interesting observation is
very different from the case with no secrecy constraint, since
without secrecy constraint separation is proven to be optimal
for source-channel coding problem [17].
Example 1. (Uncoded scheme may strictly outperform sepa-
rate scheme). Assume there is no secret key, i.e., RK = 0.
Consider the case of transmitting a Bernoulli source S ∼
Bern( 12 ) over a bandwidth-matched (γ = 1) wiretap channel
PY Z|X with X ∈ {0, 1} , Y ∈ {0, 1, e}, and Z ∈ {0, 1},
where the channel from X to Y is a binary erasure channel
BEC(),  ∈ (0, 1), and the channel from X to Z is a binary
symmetric channel BSC(p), p ∈ (0, 12). Assume 2p <  ≤
4p(1−p). Then Y is less noisy than Z, but Z is not a degraded
version of Y (see [17, Example 5.4]). Assume both the le-
gitimate user’s reconstruction and wiretapper’s reconstruction
satisfy Sˆ, Sˇ ∈ {0, 1, e}, and the distortion measures are set to
the erasure distortion functions:
dB (s, sˆ) = dE (s, sˆ) =

0, if (s, sˆ) = (0, 0) or (1, 1) ;
1, if (s, sˆ) = (0, e) or (1, e) ;
∞, if (s, sˆ) = (0, 1) or (1, 0) .
Observe that CB = RS(), hence DB ≥ . Consider
the case of DB = DE = . Then to achieve capacity,
X ∼ Bern( 12 ), and to achieve rate-distortion function, PSˆ|S
forms a BEC()8. Hence PSSˆ = PXY , and RS|Sˆ() = 0.
For less noisy wiretap channel, Γ1 (R) is given by (28).
Hence the maximum achievable RL by separate scheme is
RL,sep = I (X;Y ) − I (X;Z) = 1 −  − (1−H2(p)) =
H2(p)−, where H2 denotes the binary entropy function, i.e.,
H2(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p). On the other hand,
for uncoded scheme, the legitimate user’s distortion DB = 
can be achieved by setting X = S. Then the maximum
achievable RL by uncoded scheme is RL,unc = RS|Z() =
H2(p) − H2(p ). From the assumption p < 12 , we have
8Both the distributions PX and PSˆ|S are unique; see [21, Thm. 2.7.4].
H2(
p
 ) < 1. It implies RL,unc > RL,sep, i.e., uncoded scheme
provides stronger secrecy. Moreover, for this case,
Γ2 (R) = min
QXYZ :QX=PX ,QY |X=PY |X ,
QZ|X=PZ|X
IQ (X;Y |Z) (40)
= min
PU|XZ :PU|X=PY |X
I (X;U |Z) (41)
= H2(p)− H2(p

). (42)
Substitute this into R(o), then we have the the upper bound
R
(o)
L of the achievable RL satisfies R
(o)
L = RL,unc > RL,sep.
This implies that for the specified setting above, uncoded
scheme is optimal, and meanwhile, separate coding is strictly
suboptimal.
For the above example, if set dE (s, sˆ) to the Hamming
distortion, DE = 0, and remain other settings unchanged, then
R
(o)
L = RL,unc > RL,sep still holds. Therefore, from Remark 6,
separate scheme is not optimal in general not only for the list
secrecy problem, but also for the conventional equivocation
secrecy problem. In [8], [9], Wyner, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner have
not found this interesting point, since on one hand, only
the case of lossless communication for legitimate user was
considered by them, and on the other hand, as shown by
Theorem 2, for lossless communication case separate coding
is optimal.
Proposition 3. Separate coding is neither optimal in general
for the list secrecy (or lossy-equivocation secrecy) problem,
nor optimal in general for the conventional equivocation
secrecy problem.
Besides, when specialized to the communication over noise-
less wiretap channel (with channel capacity CB), i.e., Y =
Z = X and H(X) = CB , the problem turns into the
one considered by Schieler and Cuff [2]. For this case,
Γ1 (R) = Γ2 (R) = 0 for any R ≥ 0. Hence Theorem 3
recovers the admissible region given in [2, Thm.3], i.e.,
R =
⋃
PSˆ|S

(RK , RL, DB , DE) : γCB ≥ I(S; Sˆ),
DB ≥ EdB(S, Sˆ),
RL ≤ min
{
RK +RS|Sˆ(DE), RS(DE)
}
 .
V. GAUSSIAN COMMUNICATION
The results given in previous section can be extended
to Gaussian communication scenario. Consider the case of
communicating a Gaussian source S ∼ N (0, NS) over a
Gaussian wiretap channel, Y = X + WB , Z = Y + W ′E ,
where WB ∼ N (0, NB) and W ′E ∼ N (0, NE −NB)
are independent, and transmitting power is constrained as
limn→∞ P
[
1
n
∑n
i=1X
2
i ≤ P + δ
]
= 1,∀δ > 0. Then we
have the following theorem. The proofs of the converse part
and the achievability part are given in Appendices I and J,
respectively.
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Theorem 5 (Gaussian Communication). For the Gaussian
Shannon cipher system, the admissible region is
R =

(RK , RL, DB , DE) : DB ≥ NS(1+P/NB)γ ,
RL ≤ min
{
RK +
γ
2 log
+
(
1+P/NB
1+P/NE
)
+ 12 log
+ DB
DE
, 12 log
+ NS
DE
}
 ,
where log+ x , max {log x, 0}.
The region in Theorem 5 is illustrated in Fig. 3. If
the wiretapper’s channel satisfies NE ≤ NB , then RL ≤
min
{
RK +
1
2 log
+ DB
DE
, 12 log
+ NS
DE
}
, i.e., no secrecy can be
obtained from exploiting the wiretap channel. On the contrary,
if the wiretapper’s channel satisfies NE > NB , then RL ≤
min
{
RK+
γ
2 log
+
(
1+P/NB
1+P/NE
)
+ 12 log
+ DB
DE
, 12 log
+ NS
DE
}
, i.e.,
the secrecy of the system is obtained from exploiting the secret
key and the wiretap channel at the same time. Moreover, if the
wiretapper’s channel is bad enough such that NE ≥ P22RK−1 ,
then RL ≤ 12 log+ NSDE , i.e., the received signal Zn does not
help the wiretapper to produce a better reconstruction.
The achievability part of Theorem 5 is proven by using
a separate coding scheme. Apart from separate coding, two
uncoded schemes, permutation based scheme and orthogonal-
transform based scheme, have been proposed in [20] for secure
Gaussian broadcast communication (two or more legitimate
users are involved in the system) with matched bandwidth
(i.e., γ = 1). In these two uncoded schemes, the source
is transmitted after random permutation or random orthogo-
nal transform (according to the secret key) and (symbol-by-
symbol) scaling operation. As shown in [20], they achieve a
same region. Compared with the case of no secrecy constraint,
they do not incur any performance loss in aspect of legiti-
mate users’ distortions; and meanwhile, achieve the optimal
secrecy performance under some certain regimes. However,
the separate coding proposed in this paper cannot achieve the
optimal distortion performance for broadcast scenarios. Hence
for certain cases, the uncoded schemes in [20] will outperform
the separate coding of this paper for the bandwidth-matched
Gaussian broadcast communication.
When specialized to point-to-point communication (the
system considered in this paper), the performance of such
uncoded schemes is characterized by the following theorem.
Theorem 6 (Uncoded Schemes). [20] The uncoded schemes
above could achieve the region
R(i)unc =

(RK , RL, DB , DE) : 0 ≤ P ′ ≤ P,
DB ≥ NSNBP ′+NB ,
RL ≤ min
{
RK +
1
2 log
+
(
NSNE
DE(P ′+NE)
)
,
1
2 log
+ NS
DE
}

.
Obviously, R(i)unc ⊆ R. Moreover, it can be verified that
under condition that NE ≤ NB , DB ≤ DE or NE ≥
NB , DB =
λNB
P+NB
≥ DE , i.e., the wiretapper has a better
channel and wants to produce a worse reconstruction, or the
legitimate user’s distortion is restricted to be the Shannon limit
and meanwhile the wiretapper has a worse channel and wants
to produce a better reconstruction, the uncoded schemes above
are optimal as well.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigated the source-channel secrecy
problem with list secrecy measure for Shannon cipher system.
By associating it with optimistic source coding, we established
the equivalence between this problem and the one with secrecy
measured by a new quantity, lossy-equivocation. Utilizing
information spectrum method to bound the lossy-equivocation,
we obtained several converse results for the systems with
various classes of source-channel pairs. Some special cases
including lossless communication, communication over de-
graded wiretap channel, and Gaussian communication, were
completely resolved. For these cases, separate coding was
proven to be optimal. But this does not hold in general.
The equivalence between the henchman problem and the
lossy-equivocation secrecy problem implies that the quantity,
lossy-equivocation, indicates the minimum additional informa-
tion rate needed for the wiretapper to reconstruct the source
within a target distortion. On the other hand, the lossy-
equivocation can be considered as a lossy extension of the
conventional equivocation. Therefore, an explicit meaning of
the conventional equivocation is obtained: roughly speaking,
the conventional equivocation indicates the minimum addi-
tional rate needed for the wiretapper to reconstruct the source
losslessly. From this perspective, the conventional equivoca-
tion, however, is not suitable for lossy communication sys-
tems, especially for the communication of continuous sources,
since for these systems the wiretapper usually only want
to reconstruct a lossy version of the source. Consequently,
measuring secrecy by the lossy-equivocation is more rea-
sonable for these systems. Besides, as a generation of the
conventional equivocation, the lossy-equivocation also applies
to lossless communication systems. For these reasons, the
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lossy-equivocation secrecy is expected to have widespread
applications in general secure network communications.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Sufficiency
Suppose S˜ = {S˜m}∞m=1 achieves R(ε)S|Z(DE), and for δ > 0,
denote
R = I(S; S˜|Z) + δ, (43)
DE = D
(ε)
E (S, S˜) + δ. (44)
Then consider the following coding scheme.
Codebook Generation: For each zn, we independently
generate sequences s˜m (i, zn) , i ∈ [2mR] according to
PS˜m|Zn=zn . Denote the subcodebook as Czn , and the whole
codebook as C = {Czn}zn∈Zn .
Encoder: Upon (Sm, Zn), the encoder
fm(S
m, Zn) = M , where M is determined by
m = mini∈[2mR] dE(sm, s˜m (i, zn)).
Decoder: Upon (M,Zn), the decoder gm(M,Zn) =
s˜m (M,Zn).
Denote
T m1 =
{
(s, s˜, z) :
1
m
log
PS˜m|SmZn(s˜|s, z)
PS˜m|Zn(s˜|z)
< R
}
, (45)
T m2 =
{
(s, s˜) :
1
m
dE(s, s˜) < DE
}
×Zn. (46)
and T m = T m1 ∩ T m2 . If define
Pme = P
(
dE(S
m, gm(fm(S
m, Zn), Zn)) > DE
)
, (47)
then following from the argument in [11, proof 1) of Thm.
5.2.1], we have the following lemma. The proof is omitted
here.
Lemma 1.
Pme ≤ P
(
(Sm, S˜m, Zn) /∈ T m)+ ee−mδ . (48)
On the other hand, according to the definitions of I(·) and
D
(ε)
E (·), and from (43) and (44), we have
lim
m→∞P
(
(Sm, S˜m, Zn) /∈ T m1
)
= 0, (49)
lim inf
m→∞ P
(
(Sm, S˜m, Zn) /∈ T m2
)
< ε. (50)
Hence lim infm→∞ P
(
(Sm, S˜m, Zn) /∈ T m) < ε. Combining
this with Lemma 1 gives us lim infm→∞ Pme < ε. Therefore,
(R,DE) is optimistically ε-achievable. Letting δ → 0 com-
pletes the proof of the sufficiency.
B. Necessity
Assume there exists a sequence of Rm-rate fixed-length
codes (fm, gm)
∞
m=1 with reconstructions Sˇ = {Sˇm}∞m=1 such
that
lim sup
m→∞
Rm ≤ R, (51)
D
(ε)
E (S, Sˇ) ≤ DE . (52)
Set S˜ = Sˇ, then (52) immediately yields
D
(ε)
E (S, S˜) ≤ DE . (53)
Hence we only need prove I(S; S˜|Z) ≤ R or I(S; Sˇ|Z) ≤ R.
Notice that given Zn = zn, Sˇm = gm(fm(Sm, zn), zn))
cannot take more than 2mRm values. Then the following
lemma holds.
Lemma 2. [11, Lem. 2.6.2]
P
{
1
m
log
1
PSˇm|Zn(Sˇm|Zn)
≥ Rm + δ
}
≤ e−mδ. (54)
On the other hand,
1
m
log
PSˇm|SmZn(Sˇ
m|Sm, Zn)
PSˇm|Zn(Sˇm|Zn)
≤ 1
m
log
1
PSˇm|Zn(Sˇm|Zn)
,
(55)
and lim supm→∞Rm ≤ R for any zn. Hence it holds that
P
{
1
m
log
PSˇm|SmZn(Sˇ
m|Sm, Zn)
PSˇm|Zn(Sˇm|Zn)
≥ R+ 2δ
}
≤ e−mδ,
(56)
which further implies I(S; Sˇ|Z) ≤ R + 2δ. This means
I(S; Sˇ|Z) ≤ R because δ > 0 is arbitrary. Combining it with
(53) completes the proof of R(ε)S|Z(DE) ≤ R.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Actually, RS|Z(DE) equals the minimum source cod-
ing rate for the source S and two-sided information Z
such that DE(S, Sˇ) ≤ DE (see Theorem 1 and Remark
1); while H(S|Z) equals the minimum source coding rate
for the source S and two-sided information Z such that
lim supm→∞ P
(
Sm = Sˇm
)
> 0 [7]. Therefore, there ex-
ists a source code with rate H(S|Z) + δ, δ > 0, such
that lim supm→∞ P
(
Sm = Sˇm
)
> 0 which further implies
DE(S, Sˇ) ≤ DE for any DE ≥ D′E,min or for dE(sm, sˇm) =
1 {sm 6= sˇm} and DE = 0. Then we have RS|Z(DE) ≤
H(S|Z)+δ, since RS|Z(DE) equals the minimum coding rate
satisfying DE(S, Sˇ) ≤ DE . Observe that δ > 0 is arbitrary,
hence RS|Z(DE) ≤ H(S|Z). Similarly, we can also have
RS|Z(DE) ≥ H(S|Z) for dE(sm, sˇm) = 1 {sm 6= sˇm} and
DE = 0.
The argument above is rather superficial. To understand the
proposition more intuitively, we provide a direct proof in the
following. Note that the following proof is essentially the same
as the argument above.
For δ > 0, denote
T m =
{
(s, z) :
1
m
log
1
PSm|Zn(s|z) < H(S|Z) + δ
}
(57)
and
T m (z) = {s : (s, z) ∈ T m} . (58)
11
Then, we have PSm|Zn(s|z) > 2−m(H(S|Z)+δ) for (s, z) ∈
T m. Since it holds that
1 ≥
∑
s∈Tm(z)
PSm|Zn(s|z) (59)
>
∑
s∈Tm(z)
2−m(H(S|Z)+δ) (60)
≥ |T m (z)| 2−m(H(S|Z)+δ), (61)
we have |T m (z)| < 2m(H(S|Z)+δ) for any z.
For δ′ > 0, suppose g (s) is a sequence of func-
tions such that DE(S,g (S)) = D′E,min + δ
′. Set Sˇm ={
Sm, if (Sm, Zn) ∈ T m
sm0 , otherwise
and Sˇ∗m = gm(Sˇm), where
sm0 ∈ Sm is a constant vector. Then it immediately yields
I(S; Sˇ∗|Z) ≤ I(S; Sˇ∗Sˇ|Z) (62)
= I(S; Sˇ|Z) (63)
≤ H(Sˇ|Z), (64)
where (63) follows from that Sˇ∗m is a function of Sˇm.
It has been shown that given Zn = zn, Sˇm cannot take
more than 2m(H(S|Z)+δ) values. Hence we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. [11, Lem. 2.6.2] For any δ′′ > 0,
P
{
1
m
log
1
PSˇm|Zn(Sˇm|Zn)
≥ H(S|Z) + δ + δ′′
}
≤ e−mδ′′ .
(65)
It implies H(Sˇ|Z) ≤ H(S|Z) + δ. Therefore,
I(S; Sˇ∗|Z) ≤ H(S|Z) + δ. (66)
Next we will show DE(S, Sˇ∗) ≤ DE . First we have
‖PSmZnSˇm − PSmZnSm‖TV
=
1
2
∑
(sm1 ,zn,sm2 )∈Sm×Zn×Sm
|PSmZnSˇm (sm1 , zn, sm2 )
− PSmZnSm (sm1 , zn, sm2 ) | (67)
=
1
2
∑
(sm1 ,zn)∈Tm
∑
sm2 ∈Sm
|PSmZnSˇm (sm1 , zn, sm2 )
− PSmZnSm (sm1 , zn, sm2 ) |
+
1
2
∑
(sm1 ,zn)/∈T m
∑
sm2 ∈Sm
|PSmZnSˇm (sm1 , zn, sm2 )
− PSmZnSm (sm1 , zn, sm2 ) | (68)
=
1
2
∑
(sm1 ,zn)/∈Tm
∑
sm2 ∈Sm
|PSmZnSˇm (sm1 , zn, sm2 )
− PSmZnSm (sm1 , zn, sm2 ) | (69)
≤
∑
(sm1 ,zn)/∈T m
PSmZn (s
m
1 , z
n) (70)
= P
[
(Sm, Zn) /∈ T m]. (71)
On the other hand,
P
[
(Sm, Zn) /∈ T m]
= 1− P[ 1
m
log
1
PSm|Zn(Sm|Zn) < H(S|Z) + δ
]
(72)
and according to the definition of H(S|Z),
lim sup
m→∞
P
[ 1
m
log
1
PSm|Zn(Sm|Zn) < H(S|Z) + δ
]
> 0.
(73)
Combining (71), (72) and (73) gives us
lim inf
m→∞ ‖PSmZnSˇm − PSmZnSm‖TV < 1, (74)
which further yields
lim inf
m→∞ ‖PSmSˇm − PSmSm‖TV < 1. (75)
Furthermore, for any DE ≥ D′E,min +
δ′, we have DE(S,g (S)) ≤ DE , i.e.,
limm→∞ P [dE(Sm, gm(Sm)) ≥ DE + δ′′] = 0,∀δ′′ > 0.
Combining it with (75), and according to the definition of
total variation distance, we have
lim inf
m→∞ P
[
dE(S
m, gm(Sˇm)) ≥ DE + δ′′
]
< 1, (76)
i.e.,
lim sup
m→∞
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇ∗m) < DE + δ′′
]
> 0. (77)
Since δ′′ > 0 is arbitrary, it must hold that
DE(S, Sˇ
∗) ≤ DE . (78)
Combining (66) with (78) and by the definition of
RS|Z(DE), we have
RS|Z(DE) ≤ I(S; Sˇ∗|Z) ≤ H(S|Z) + δ. (79)
Since δ > 0 is arbitrary, it holds that
RS|Z(DE) ≤ H(S|Z). (80)
Similarly, it can be shown that both RS|Z(DE) ≤ H(S|Z)
and RS|Z(DE) ≥ H(S|Z) hold for the case of dE(sm, sˇm) =
1 {sm 6= sˇm} and DE = 0.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF CONVERSE OF THEOREM 2
From source-channel coding theorem [17], we have γCB ≥
H (S). Furthermore, if RL > RS (DE), then no matter what
scheme Nodes A and B use, the henchman and the wiretapper
can ignore Zn altogether and simply use a point-to-point rate-
distortion code to describe Sm within distortion DE (with
probability 1). Hence, to prevent the wiretapper from achieving
this, it should hold that RL ≤ RS (DE). Furthermore, to show
the converse part, we only need to prove if (RK , RL, DE) is
achievable, then
RL ≤ RK + γΓ1
( 1
γ
H (S)
)
, (81)
or equivalently to show
RS|Z(DE) ≤ RK + γΓ1
( 1
γ
H (S)
)
. (82)
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To that end, we borrow the information spectrum method
[11]. By Proposition 1 together with Remark 2, we have
RS|Z(DE) ≤ H(S|Z). (83)
Next we prove H(S|Z) ≤ RK + γΓ1
(
1
γH (S)
)
.
Consider
H(S|Z) ≤ H(SK|Z) (84)
≤ H(K|Z) +H(S|ZK) (85)
≤ H(K) +H(S|ZK) (86)
= RK +H(S|ZK). (87)
To upper bound H(S|ZK), the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 4. [11, Thm.1.7.2] For any PKSZ,
H(S|ZK) ≤ lim inf
m→∞
1
m
H(Sm|ZnK). (88)
Observe that if K = ∅, the term 1mH(Sm|Zn) is just
the conventional equivocation defined in [8], [9]. Csisza´r
et al. [9] proved that when there is no the secret key
K, 1mH(S
m|Zn) ≤ γΓ1
(
1
γH (S)
)
holds. Here we follow
similar steps to their proof, and show that for the case
with secret key, 1mH(S
m|ZnK) is also upper bounded by
γΓ1
(
1
γH (S)
)
.
Denote m = P(Sm 6= Sˆm), then limm→∞ m = 0. By
Fano’s inequality,
H(Sm|Y nK) ≤ 1 +mm |S| ≤ m′m, (89)
where ′m is a term such that limm→∞ 
′
m = 0. Then we have
H(Sm|ZnK) ≤ H(Sm|ZnK)−H(Sm|Y nK) +m′m
(90)
= I(Sm;Y n|K)− I(Sm;Zn|K) +m′m.
(91)
Observe that
I(Sm;Y n|K) =
n∑
i=1
I(Sm;Yi|Y i−1Zni+1K) + Σ1 − Σ2,
(92)
I(Sm;Zn|K) =
n∑
i=1
I(Sm;Zi|Y i−1Zni+1K) + Σ∗1 − Σ∗2,
(93)
where
Σ1 =
n∑
i=1
I(Zni+1;Yi|Y i−1K), (94)
Σ∗1 =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1;Zi|Zni+1K), (95)
and Σ2,Σ∗2 are the analogous sums with S
mK instead of K.
By Csisza´r Sum Identity [9], [17], Σ1 = Σ∗1 and Σ2 = Σ
∗
2.
Therefore,
1
m
H(Sm|ZnK)
≤ 1
m
n∑
i=1
I(Sm;Yi|Y i−1Zni+1K)
− 1
m
n∑
i=1
I(Sm;Zi|Y i−1Zni+1K) + ′m (96)
= γI(Sm;YQ|Y Q−1ZnQ+1KQ)
− γI(Sm;ZQ|Y Q−1ZnQ+1KQ) + ′m (97)
= γI(V ;Y |U)− γI(V ;Z|U) + ′m, (98)
where Q denotes a timesharing random variable uniformly dis-
tributed over [n], and U , Y Q−1ZnQ+1KQ,V , SmU, Y ,
YQ, Z , ZQ.
Furthermore,
H (S) ≤ 1
m
I(Sm;Y n|K) + ′m, (99)
1
m
I(Sm;Y n|K) = 1
m
n∑
i=1
I(Sm;Yi|Y i−1K) (100)
≤ 1
m
n∑
i=1
I(SmY i−1Zni+1K;Yi) (101)
= γI(V ;Y ), (102)
and
1
m
I(Sm;Y n|K)
=
1
m
n∑
i=1
I(Sm;Yi|Y i−1Zni+1K) +
1
m
Σ1 − 1
m
Σ2 (103)
≤ 1
m
n∑
i=1
I(Sm;Yi|Y i−1Zni+1K) +
1
m
Σ1 (104)
=
1
m
n∑
i=1
I(Sm;Yi|Y i−1Zni+1K) +
1
m
Σ∗1 (105)
= γI(Sm;YQ|Y Q−1ZnQ+1KQ) + γI(Y Q−1;ZQ|ZnQ+1KQ)
(106)
≤ γI(Sm;YQ|Y Q−1ZnQ+1KQ) + γI(Y Q−1ZnQ+1KQ;ZQ)
(107)
= γI(V ;Y |U) + γI(U ;Z). (108)
Combining (83), (87), (88), (98), (99), (102) and (108), we
have
RL ≤ RK + sup
PX|KS
lim inf
m→∞
(
γΓ˜1
(
1
γ
H (S)− ′m
)
+ ′m
)
(109)
≤ RK + γΓ˜1
(
1
γ
H (S)
)
, (110)
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where
Γ˜1 (R) , max
PXPV |XPU|V :
I(V ;Y )≥R,
I(V ;Y |U)+I(U ;Z)≥R
[I (V ;Y |U)− I (V ;Z|U)] .
(111)
Actually Γ˜1 (R) = Γ1 (R) for any R ≥ 0 (see [9, Proof of
Cor.2 ]), hence
RL ≤ RK + γΓ1
(
1
γ
H (S)
)
. (112)
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF OUTER BOUND OF THEOREM 3
Suppose QY Z|X is the pmf achieving the minimization
in the definition of Γ2 (R). Hence it satisfies QY |X =
PY |X , QZ|X = PZ|X . Furthermore, given the code adopted
by Nodes A and B, the achievability of (RK , RL, DB , DE)
only depends on the margin distributions of the wiretap
channel. Hence the admissible region R does not change if
we replace the channel PY Z|X with QY Z|X . In the following,
without loss of generality, we only need consider the case of
PY Z|X = QY Z|X , i.e., PY Z|X achieves Γ2 (R).
Following the argument for lossless communication case,
it should hold that RL ≤ RS (DE). Next, we prove that if
(RK , RL, DB , DE) is achievable, then there exists a condi-
tional pmf PSˆ|S such that
γCB ≥ I(S; Sˆ), (113)
DB ≥ EdB(S, Sˆ), (114)
RS|Z(DE) ≤ RK + γΓ2
( 1
γ
I(S; Sˆ)
)
+RS|Sˆ(DE). (115)
Since I(S; Sˇ|Z) ≤ I(S; SˇYK|Z), we have
RS|Z(DE)
≤ inf
PSˇ|SZYK:DE(S,Sˇ)≤DE
I(S; SˇYK|Z) (116)
≤I(S; Y|Z) + I(S; K|YZ)
+ inf
PSˇ|SZYK:DE(S,Sˇ)≤DE
I(S; Sˇ|KYZ). (117)
By data processing inequality,
I(S; Y|Z) ≤ γI(X; Y|Z). (118)
The second term in (117) is bounded by
I(S; K|YZ) ≤ H(K|YZ) ≤ H(K) = RK , (119)
and the last term in (117) is bounded by
inf
PSˇ|SZYK:DE(S,Sˇ)≤DE
I(S; Sˇ|KYZ)
= inf
PSˇ|SZYKSˆ:DE(S,Sˇ)≤DE
I(S; Sˇ|KYZSˆ) (120)
≤ inf
PSˇ|SSˆ:DE(S,Sˇ)≤DE
I(S; Sˇ|KYZSˆ) (121)
≤ inf
PSˇ|SSˆ:DE(S,Sˇ)≤DE
I(S; Sˇ|Sˆ) (122)
,RS|Sˆ(DE), (123)
where (120) follows from SSˇZ → KY → Sˆ, and (122)
follows from that for any Sˇ such that KYZ→ SSˆ→ Sˇ,
I(S; Sˇ|KYZSˆ)
= p-lim sup
m→∞
1
m
log
PSˇm|SmSˆm(Sˇ
m|SmSˆm)
PSˇm|SˆmY nZnK(Sˇ
m|SmSˆmY nZnK)
(124)
= p-lim sup
m→∞
(
1
m
log
PSˇm|SmSˆm(Sˇ
m|SmSˆm)
PSˇm|Sˆm(Sˇ
m|Sˆm)
− 1
m
log
PSˇm|SˆmY nZnK(Sˇ
m|SmSˆmY nZnK)
PSˇm|Sˆm(Sˇ
m|Sˆm)
)
(125)
≤I(S; Sˇ|Sˆ)− I(KYZ; Sˇ|Sˆ) (126)
≤I(S; Sˇ|Sˆ). (127)
The inequality (127) follows from I(KYZ; Sˇ|Sˆ) ≥ 0, which
is a conditional version of [11, Eqn. (3.2.3)].
Combining (117), (118), (119) and (123) gives us
RS|Z(DE) ≤ RK + γI(X; Y|Z) +RS|Sˆ(DE). (128)
Hence to show (113)-(115) we only need to prove there exists
a conditional pmf PSˆ|S such that (113), (114), and
I(X; Y|Z) ≤ Γ2
( 1
γ
I(S; Sˆ)
)
, (129)
RS|Sˆ(DE) ≤ RS|Sˆ(DE). (130)
We first consider (129), and prove I(X; Y|Z) ≤
Γ2
(
1
γ I(S; Sˆ)
)
. Denote Xn, and Y n and Zn to be output
variables of the channel corresponding to Xn. We also denote
X
n
to be a sequence of independent random variables with
pmf PXn =
∏n
i=1 PXi , and Y
n
and Z
n
to be output
variables of the channel corresponding to X
n
. Obviously,
PXiY iZi = PXiYiZi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Consider the sequence of
random variables
Un ,
1
n
log
PY n|XnZn(Y n|Xn, Zn)
PY n|Zn(Y n|Zn)
(131)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
PYiZi|Xi(Yi, Zi|Xi)
PY i|Zi(Yi|Zi)PZi|Xi(Zi|Xi)
(132)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
PYiZi|Xi(Yi, Zi|Xi)
PYi|Zi(Yi|Zi)PZi|Xi(Zi|Xi)
(133)
where (132) follows from that PY n|Zn , PY nZn|Xn and
PZn|Xn are memoryless.
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From the sub-additivity of p-lim sup [11, Sec. 1.3], and by
introducing the product distribution PY n|Zn , we obtain
I(Y; X|Z) = p-lim sup
n→∞
(
1
n
log
PY n|XnZn(Y n|Xn, Zn)
PY n|Zn(Y n|Zn)
− 1
n
log
PY n|Zn(Y n|Zn)
PY n|Zn(Y n|Zn)
)
(134)
≤ p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
PY n|XnZn(Y n|Xn, Zn)
PY n|Zn(Y n|Zn)
− p-lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
PY n|Zn(Y n|Zn)
PY n|Zn(Y n|Zn)
. (135)
The final term is non-negative following [11, Lem. 3.2.1] and
hence
I(Y; X|Z) ≤ p-lim sup
n→∞
Un. (136)
Now we bound p-lim sup n→∞ Un. First define the informa-
tion density random variables Li as
Li , log
PYiZi|Xi(Yi, Zi|Xi)
PYi|Zi(Yi|Zi)PZi|Xi(Zi|Xi)
. (137)
Then
Un =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Li. (138)
Obviously,
E[Li] = I (Yi;Xi|Zi) . (139)
Now define
PX˜ (x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
PXi (x) (140)
and the induced distribution
PX˜Y˜ Z˜ (x, y, z) = PX˜ (x)PY Z|X (y, z|x) . (141)
Since I (Y ;X|Z) is a concave-∩ function of the input prob-
ability distribution PX [19, Thm. 2], we have
1
n
n∑
i=1
I (Yi;Xi|Zi) ≤ I
(
X˜; Y˜ |Z˜
)
. (142)
It means that
µ , E
[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Li
]
≤ I
(
X˜; Y˜ |Z˜
)
≤ min {log |X | , log |Y|} .
(143)
Furthermore, by [11, Rmk. 3.1.1]
Var [Li] ≤ log 8 min {|X | , |Y|}
e2
, σ20 , (144)
and
Var
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Li
]
=
1
n2
n∑
i=1
Var [Li] ≤ σ
2
0
n
. (145)
Hence by the Chebyshev inequality, for any α > 0,
P
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
Li − µ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ α
]
≤ σ
2
0
nα2
. (146)
The upper bound σ
2
0
nα2 clearly tends to zero as n→∞. From
the definition of p-lim sup , we have for any α > 0,
p-lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
Li ≤ lim sup
n→∞
µ+ α. (147)
Finally combine (136), (138), (143) and (147), then we have
I(Y; X|Z) ≤ I
(
X˜; Y˜ |Z˜
)
+ α. (148)
In the same way, we have
1
γ
I(S; Sˆ) ≤ I(X; Y) ≤ I
(
X˜; Y˜
)
+ α ≤ CB + α. (149)
Combining (148) and (149), we have
I(Y; X|Z) ≤ I
(
X˜; Y˜ |Z˜
)
+ α (150)
≤ max
PX :I(X;Y )≥ 1γ I(S;Sˆ)−α
I (X;Y |Z) + α (151)
= Γ2
(
1
γ
I(S; Sˆ)− α
)
+ α, (152)
where (152) follows from the assumption that the considered
channel PY Z|X achieves Γ2 (R).
Since (149) and (152) hold for any α > 0 and Γ2 (R) is
continuous in R [8], by letting α→ 0, we have
1
γ
I(S; Sˆ) ≤ CB , (153)
I(Y; X|Z) ≤ Γ2
(
1
γ
I(S; Sˆ)
)
. (154)
Furthermore, from the assumption, we have
DB(S, Sˆ) ≤ DB . (155)
From (153)-(155), and the fact that Γ2 (R) is a decreasing
function, we have that to complete the proof, we only need
prove there exists a conditional pmf PSˆ|S such that
I(S; Sˆ) ≥ I(S; Sˆ), (156)
DB(S, Sˆ) ≥ EdB(S, Sˆ), (157)
RS|Sˆ(DE) ≤ RS|Sˆ(DE). (158)
For
(
Sm, Sˆm
)
, denote Vˇ m to be a sequence of condition-
ally independent random variables with pmf PVˇm|SmSˆm =∏m
i=1 PVˇi|SiSˆi . Then we have
RS|Sˆ(DE) ≤ inf
PVˇ|SSˆ:DE(S,Vˇ)≤DE
I(S; Vˇ|Sˆ). (159)
For
(
Sm, Sˆm, Vˇ m
)
, denote (Um, V m) to be a sequence
of independent random variables with pmf PSmUmVm =∏
PSiUiVi , and PSiUiVi = PSiSˆiVˇi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Following
similar steps to (134)-(147), we can get
I(S; Vˇ|Sˆ) ≤ lim sup
m→∞
E
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
log
PVi|SiUi(Vˇi|SiSˆi)
PVi|Ui(Vˇi|Sˆi)
]
(160)
= lim sup
m→∞
I (SQ;VQ|UQQ) , (161)
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where Q is a timesharing random variable and uniformly
distributed over [m], independent of other random variables.
By [11, Lem. 5.8.1] and [11, Lem. 5.8.2] we have
DB(S, Sˆ) ≥ DB(S,U) = lim sup
m→∞
EdB (SQ, UQ) , (162)
and
I(S; Sˆ) ≥ I(S; U) (163)
= lim sup
m→∞
I (SQ;UQ|Q) (164)
≥ lim sup
m→∞
I (SQ;UQ) . (165)
Following similar steps to the proof of the first inequality of
[11, Thm. 1.7.2] and the proof of [11, Lem. 5.8.1], we have
DE(S, Vˇ) ≤ DE(S,V) = lim inf
m→∞ EdE (SQ, VQ) . (166)
According to the definitions of liminf and limsup, for any
arbitrarily small  > 0, there always exists a sufficiently large
m0 such that
lim sup
m→∞
I (SQ;VQ|UQQ) ≤ I (SQ;VQ|UQQ) + ,∃m ≥ m0,
(167)
lim inf
m→∞ EdE (SQ, VQ) ≤ EdE (SQ, VQ) + ,∀m ≥ m0,
(168)
lim sup
m→∞
EdB (SQ, UQ) ≥ EdB (SQ, UQ)− ,∀m ≥ m0,
(169)
lim sup
m→∞
I (SQ;UQ) ≥ I (SQ;UQ)− ,∀m ≥ m0.
(170)
Hence there exists some m (or equivalently there exists some
(VQ, UQ, Q)) satisfying the inequalities (167)-(170) simulta-
neously. Combining (159), (161), (166), (167) and (168) gives
us (the subscript Q is omitted)
RS|Sˆ(DE) ≤ inf
PV |SUQ:EdE(S,V )+≤DE
I (S;V |UQ) + 
(171)
= RS|UQ(DE − ) +  (172)
≤ RS|U (DE − ) + , (173)
where (173) follows from the fact that introducing side infor-
mation reduces the minimum rate of source coding. Combining
(162), (165), (169) and (170) gives us (the subscript Q is
omitted)
DB(S, Sˆ) ≥ EdB (S,U)− , (174)
I(S; Sˆ) ≥ I (S;U)− . (175)
Since  > 0 is arbitrary and rate-distortion function RS|U (·)
is continuous, combining (173), (174) and (175) gives us
DB(S, Sˆ) ≥ EdB (S,U) , (176)
I(S; Sˆ) ≥ I (S;U) , (177)
RS|Sˆ(DE) ≤ RS|U (DE). (178)
Hence PU |S is the desired distribution. This completes the
proof of the converse part.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF INNER BOUND R(i)SEP OF THEOREM 3
It is hard to obtain any satisfactory inner bound through
bounding the lossy-equivocation directly, but it is feasible by
analyzing the henchman problem instead. Next we prove R(i)sep
by following similar steps to the proof of the achievability part
in [2]. It is worth noting that the complications introduced by
a source-channel setting compared to [2] mainly comes from
that, for the following equivalent subproblem, the chosen index
is not uniformly or nearly-uniformly distributed in general
(which is dependent on the codebook) given the wiretapper’s
received signal. This is different from noiseless channel case
[2]. For that case, the chosen index naturally has a uniform
conditional distribution. Hence the proof given in [2] cannot be
applied to our case directly. To address this difficulty, we first
need to find a high-probability set of codebooks on which the
chosen index with a nearly-uniform conditional distribution
(given the wiretapper’s received signal) is generated. Then
following similar steps to the proof given in [2], we show that
for any codebook in this high-probability set, the probability
that the wiretapper achieves the target distortion vanishes. This
leads to our result. Furthermore, applying two-layered secrecy-
channel code is necessary to achieve the desired performance.
This makes our problem more complicated.
Before proving R(i)sep of Theorem 3, we first consider the
following equivalent problem (the proof of the equivalence
will be given in Appendix E-B).
A. Subproblem: lossy compression of a codeword drawn uni-
formly from a random codebook with side information
Let  > 0. Assume X and Y are the variables
achieving the maximum in the definition of Γ1 (R) with
R = 1γ
(
I(S; Sˆ) + 3
)
. Then I (V ;Y |U) − I (V ;Z|U) =
Γ1
(
1
γ
(
I(S; Sˆ) + 3
))
and I (V ;Y ) ≥ 1γ
(
I(S; Sˆ) + 3
)
.
Fix
R0 = γI (U ;Y )− , (179)
R1 = γI (V ;Y |U)− , (180)
R′1 = γI (V ;Z|U) + , (181)
and define9
Rt = R0 +R1, (182)
Rc = R1 −R′1, (183)
Rp = Rt −Rc −RK = R0 +R′1 −RK . (184)
Hence Rt ≥ I(S; Sˆ) + . Besides, for simplicity we assume
mγ is an integer, hence n = mγ.
Codebook Generation: Randomly and independently
generate sequences sˆm(jk, jp, jc), (jk, jp, jc) ∈
[2mRK ][2mRp ][2mRc ] with each according to
∏m
i=1 PSˆ (sˆi).
Randomly and independently generate sequences
un(m0),m0 ∈ [2mR0 ] with each according to
∏n
i=1 PU (ui),
and for each message m0 ∈ [2mR0 ], randomly and
9Assume RK ≤ Rt−Rc. If RK > Rt−Rc, then only Rt−Rc rate of
key is used in our scheme.
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independently generate sequences vn(m0,m1),m1 ∈ [2mR1 ]
with each according to
∏n
i=1 PV |U (vi|ui(m0)). The codebook
C =
{
sˆm(jk, jp, jc), (jk, jp, jc) ∈ [2mRK ][2mRp ][2mRc ],
(un(m0), v
n(m0,m1)) , (m0,m1) ∈ [2mR0 ][2mR1 ]
}
,
is revealed to all parties including the wiretapper.
Subproblem: Denote j = (jk, jp, jc)10, then choose an
index J uniformly at random from [2mRK ][2mRp ][2mRc ] and
generate Mk = Jk ∧ K, where ∧ is the one-time pad
operation. Map (Mk, Jp) into (M0,M ′1) ∈ [2mR0 ][2mR
′
1 ]
through an arbitrary bijective function (m0,m′1) = g(mk, jp).
Denote M , (M0,M1),M1 , (M ′1,Mc),Mc , Jc. Given
K = k, the mapping between M and J , denoted as j(m, k) or
m(j, k), is also bijective. Moreover, since J follows a uniform
distribution, M follows a uniform distribution as well.
Based on the codebook above, on one hand, pass sˆm (J)
through a memoryless channel
∏
PS|Sˆ to generate a sequence
Sm; on the other hand, pass vn (M) through a memoryless
channel
∏
PZ|V to generate a sequence Zn (this is equiv-
alent to applying a stochastic channel encoder PXn|M,C =∏n
i=1 PX|V (xi|vi (M)) for the channel
∏
PZ|X ). Finally,
transmit Sm over a Rm rate noiseless channel with the help
of two-sided information (Zn,M0). See Fig. 4.
The distribution QKSmJMSˆmUnV nY nZn incurred by the
subproblem above can be expressed as
QKSmJMSˆmUnV nY nZn
,PKQSmJPSˆm|JPM |KJPUnV n|MPY nZn|V n
=2−mRKQSmJ1{sˆm = Sˆm(j)}PM |KJ
1 {un = Un(m0), vn = V n(m)}
∏
PY Z|V , (185)
where PM |KJ is the distribution induced by the one-time pad
operation, and
QSmJ(s
m, j) , 2−mRt
m∏
i=1
PS|Sˆ(si|sˆi(j)). (186)
It is easy to verify
EC
[
QSmSˆm (s
m, sˆm)
]
=
m∏
i=1
PSSˆ(si, sˆi), (187)
and
EC [QUnV nY nZn (un, vn, yn, zn)] =
n∏
i=1
PUV Y Z(ui, vi, yi, zi).
(188)
For this subproblem, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7. If
lim sup
m→∞
Rm ≤ min
{
RK + γΓ1
( 1
γ
(I(S; Sˆ) + 3)
)
+RS|Sˆ(DE), RS(DE)
}
− 5, (189)
then
lim
m→∞ECZnM0
[
max
Rmcodes
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE |CZnM0
]]
= 0.
(190)
10The subscripts means “key”, “public”, and “channel”, respectively.
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Fig. 4. Lossy compression of a codeword drawn uniformly from a random
codebook with side information.
Proof of Theorem 7: To prove Theorem 7 we need the
following lemma, the proof of which is given in Appendix F.
Lemma 5. For any sequence of random variables {Xn} and
any sequence of events {An}, limn→∞ P (An) = 0, if and
only if limn→∞ P [P (An|Xn) > τn] = 0 for some sequence
{τn} such that τn > 0 and limn→∞ τn = 0.
From Lemma 5, to prove Theorem 7 we only need to show
that if Rm satisfies (189), then
lim
m→∞PCZnM0
[
max
Rmcodes
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE |CZnM0
]
> τm
]
= 0, (191)
for some sequence {τm} with τm > 0 and limm→∞ τm = 0.
Next we prove this.
First define several events
A1 ,
{(
Sm, Sˆm (J)
) ∈ T mδ } , (192)
A2 , {(Un (M0) , Zn) ∈ T nδ′ } , (193)
A3 , {(Un (M0) , V n (M0,M1) , Zn) ∈ T nδ } , (194)
A123 , A1A2A3, (195)
A23 , A2A3, (196)
B ,

min
(m0,mc,zn):(Un(m0),zn)∈T nδ′
φC (m0,mc, zn) ≥ 1,
max
(m0,mc,zn):(Un(m0),zn)∈T nδ′
φC (m0,mc, zn) ≤ 22m
 ,
(197)
where 0 < δ′ < δ,
φC (m0,mc, zn) ,∑
m′1∈[2mR
′
1 ]
1 {(Un (m0) , V n (m0,m′1,mc) , zn) ∈ T nδ }
(198)
and  is the same to that in (189). Observe that if the codebook
satisfies B, then for any (m0,mc, zn) ∈
[
2mR0
] [
2mRc
]Zn
such that (Un (m0) , zn) ∈ T nδ′ , it holds that
2mRc ≤
∑
m1∈[2mR1 ]
1 {(Un (m0) , V n (m0,m1) , zn) ∈ T nδ }
≤ 2m(Rc+2). (199)
The δ-typical set is defined according to the notion of strong
typicality, see [17]:
T mδ (S) , {sm ∈ Sm : |Tsm − PS | < δPS}, (200)
where Tsm denotes the type (or empirical distribution) of sm.
For simplicity, T mδ (S) is also shortly denoted as T mδ .
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Then we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 6. limm→∞ P [A123] = 1.
Lemma 7. limm→∞ P [B] = 1.
Lemma 8. For any codebook c satisfying B,
P (M1 = m1,A3|C = c, Zn = zn,M0 = m0)
≤2−m(Rc−δ)1 {(Un (m0) , V n (m0,m1) , zn) ∈ T nδ } ,
where δ is a term such that δ → 0 as δ → 0.
The proofs of Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 are given in Ap-
pendices G and H, respectively. Furthermore, from (187) and
(188), and the fact typical set has total probability close to one
[17], we can easily establish Lemma 6.
Consider that the optimal Rm-rate code
that maximizes P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE |CZnM0
]
is adopted. Then we only need to show
lim
m→∞PCZnM0
[
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE |CZnM0
]
> τm
]
= 0
for this code. By utilizing Lemmas 5, 6 and 7, we have
PCZnM0
[
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE |CZnM0
]
> τm
]
≤PCZnM0
[
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE |CZnM0
]
> τm,B,
P [Ac123|CZnM0] ≤ m
]
+ P [Bc]
+ P [P [Ac123|CZnM0] > m] (201)
≤PCZnM0
[
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE |CZnM0
]
> τm,B,
P [Ac123|CZnM0] ≤ m
]
+ ′m, (202)
for some m and ′m such that m → 0 and ′m → 0 as
m→∞. Furthermore,
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE |CZnM0
]
≤P [dE(Sm, Sˇm) ≤ DE ,A123|CZnM0]
+ P [Ac123|CZnM0] (203)
≤P [dE(Sm, Sˇm) ≤ DE ,A123|CZnM0]+ m, (204)
where (204) follows from the event P [Ac123|CZnM0] ≤ m in
(202).
Owing to the rate constraint, given (C, Zn,M0), the recon-
struction Sˇm cannot take more than Rm values. Denote the
set of possible values as c(C, Zn,M0). Then
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE ,A123|CZnM0
]
=P
[
min
sˇm∈c(C,Zn,M0)
dE(S
m, sˇm) ≤ DE ,A123|CZnM0
]
.
(205)
Now we apply a union bound to (205) and write
P
[
min
sˇm∈c(C,Zn,M0)
dE(S
m, sˇm) ≤ DE ,A123|CZnM0
]
≤
∑
sˇm∈c(C,Zn,M0)
P
[
dE(S
m, sˇm) ≤ DE ,A123|CZnM0
]
(206)
≤2mRm max
sˇm∈c(C,Zn,M0)
P
[
dE(S
m, sˇm) ≤ DE ,A123|CZnM0
]
(207)
≤2mRm max
sˇm∈Sˇm
P
[
dE(S
m, sˇm) ≤ DE ,A123|CZnM0
]
(208)
=2mRm max
sˇm∈Sˇm
2mR1∑
m1=1
2mRK∑
k=1
P [M1 = m1,A23|CZnM0]
× P [K = k|A23CZnM ]
× P [dE(Sm, sˇm) ≤ DE ,A1|A23CZnMK] (209)
≤2m(Rm−RK) max
sˇm∈Sˇm
2mR1∑
m1=1
2mRK∑
k=1
P [M1 = m1,A3|CZnM0]
× P
[
dE(S
m, sˇm) ≤ DE ,A1|Sˆm (j (m, k))
]
, (210)
where (206) follows from a union bound, and (210) follows
from P [K = k|A23CZnM ] = P [K = k|M ] = 2−mRK and
A23CZnMK → Sˆm (J)→ SmA1.
Furthermore, for any codebook c satisfying B
and for any (m0,mc, zn) ∈
[
2mR0
] [
2mRc
]Zn
such that (Un (m0) , zn) ∈ T nδ′ , there exists at
most 22m codewords V n (m0,m′1,mc) such that
(Un (m0) , V
n (m0,m
′
1,mc) , z
n) ∈ T nδ . Define
Am0,mc,zn , {m′1 : (Un (m0) , V n (m0,m′1,mc) , zn) ∈ T nδ } .
Then we can bound
|Am0,mc,zn | ≤ 22m, (211)
for any (m0,mc, zn) ∈
[
2mR0
] [
2mRc
]Zn such that
(Un (m0) , z
n) ∈ T nδ′ .
Combining (205), (210) and Lemma 8, we have
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE ,A123|CZnM0
]
≤2mλ max
sˇm∈Sˇm
2mRK∑
k=1
2mRc∑
mc=1
∑
m′1∈Am0,mc,zn
P
[
dE(S
m, sˇm) ≤ DE ,A1|Sˆm (j (m, k))
]
, (212)
where λ = Rm−RK −Rc + δ . Combining (202), (204) and
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(212), we further have
PCZnM0
[
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE
]
> τm
]
≤ PCZnM0
[
max
sˇm∈Sˇm
2mRK∑
k=1
2mRc∑
mc=1
∑
m′1∈Am0,mc,zn
ηm,k,sˇm > τ
′
m2
−mλ
]
+ ′m (213)
≤ PCZnM0
[
max
sˇm∈Sˇm,m′1∈[2mR
′
1 ]
2mRK∑
k=1
2mRc∑
mc=1
ηm,k,sˇm > τ
′
m2
−mλ′
]
+ ′m (214)
≤ 2mR′1 |Sˇ|m max
sˇm∈Sˇm,m′1∈[2mR
′
1 ]
PCZnM0
[ 2mRK∑
k=1
2mRc∑
mc=1
ηm,k,sˇm > τ
′
m2
−mλ′
]
+ ′m,
(215)
where τ ′m = τm − m, λ′ = λ+ 2 and
ηm,k,sˇm , P
[
dE(S
m, sˇm) ≤ DE ,A1|Sˆm (j (m, k))
]
(216)
=
∑
sm∈Sm
m∏
i=1
PS|Sˆ
(
si|Sˆi (j (m, k))
)
1
{
dE(s
m, sˇm) ≤ DE ,
(
sm, Sˆm (j (m, k))
) ∈ T nδ } . (217)
To guarantee τ ′m > 0 for any m, we choose the sequence
{τm} such that τm > m.
If we can show that the probability in (215) decays doubly
exponentially fast with m, then the proof will be complete.
Now we prove this.
Note that ηm,k,sˇm is a quantity depending on Sˆm (j (m, k)),
and the one-time pad satisfies that given mk, different k’s
correspond to different jk’s. Hence given (m0,m′1), for differ-
ent (k,mc)’s, j (m, k)’s are different as well. This guarantees
that given (sˇm,m0,m′1), ηm,k,sˇm , (mc, k) ∈ [2mRc ][2mRK ]
are i.i.d. random variables due to the nature of the random
codebook, with mean
ECηm,k,sˇm
= ECP
[
dE(S
m, sˇm) ≤ DE ,A1|Sˆm (j (m, k))
]
(218)
≤ ECP
[
dE(S
m, sˇm) ≤ DE , Sm ∈ T mδ |Sˆm (j (m, k))
]
(219)
= P [dE(Sm, sˇm) ≤ DE , Sm ∈ T mδ ] . (220)
Now we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 9. [2] If Sm is i.i.d. according to PS , then for any
sˇm,
P[d(Sm, sˇm) ≤ DE , Sm ∈ T mδ ] ≤ 2−m(RS(DE)−m,δ),
(221)
where m,δ is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and m→∞.
Lemma 10. [2] Fix PSSˆ and sˆ
m ∈ Sˆm. If Sm is distributed
according to
∏m
i=1 PS|Sˆ=sˆi , then for any sˇ
m,
P[d(Sm, sˇm) ≤ DE , (Sm, sˆm) ∈ T mδ |Sˆm = sˆm]
≤ 2−m(RS|Sˆ(DE)−m,δ), (222)
where m,δ is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and m→∞.
Lemma 11. [2] If X l is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables
on the interval [0, a] with E[Xi] = p, then
P
[ l∑
i=1
Xi > k
]
≤
(
e·l·p
k
)k/a
. (223)
From Lemmas 9 and 10, we see that
ECηm,k,sˇm ≤ 2−m(RS(DE)−m,δ), (224)
ηm,k,sˇm ≤ 2−m(RS|Sˆ(DE)−m,δ). (225)
Using these bounds, we can apply Lemma 11 to the prob-
ability in (215) by identifying
l ≤ 2m(RK+Rc) (226)
a = 2−m(RS|Sˆ(DE)−m,δ) (227)
p ≤ 2−m(RS(DE)−m,δ) (228)
k = τ ′m2
−mλ′ = τ ′m2
−m(Rm−RK−Rc+δ+2). (229)
Set {τ ′m} with τ ′m > 0 to be a sub-exponential sequence (i.e.,
τ ′m = 2
−o(m)) by choosing a proper {τm}. Then we have
P
[ 2mRK∑
k=1
2mRc∑
mc=1
ηm,k,sˇm > τ
′
m2
−mλ′
]
≤ 2−mα2mβ , (230)
where
α = − (RK +Rc) +RS(DE)− m,δ
− (Rm −RK −Rc + δ + 2)
= RS(DE)−Rm − 2− δ − m,δ
≥ 3− δ − m,δ, (231)
β = RS|Sˆ(DE)− m,δ − (Rm −RK −Rc + δ + 2)
= RS|Sˆ(DE) +RK + γΓ1
( 1
γ
(I(S; Sˆ) + 3)
)
−Rm − δ − 4− m,δ
≥ − δ − m,δ. (232)
For any fixed , large enough m and small enough δ, both
α and β are positive and bounded away from zero. Then (230)
vanishes doubly exponentially fast, and it in turn implies (215)
vanishes. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
B. Likelihood encoder
Consider the codebook defined in the above subprob-
lem, and define a likelihood encoder by PJ|Sm(j|sm) ∝∏m
i=1 PS|Sˆ(si|sˆi(j)), where ∝ indicates that appropriate nor-
malization is required. Now we consider Node A concatenates
this likelihood encoder, the one-time pad Mk = Jk ∧K, the
bijective function (m0,m′1) = g(mk, jp), and the stochastic
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channel encoder PXn|M,C =
∏n
i=1 PX|V (xi|vi (M)) as de-
scribed in the subproblem above. For such cascaded encoder,
the induced overall distribution is
PKSmJMSˆmUnV nY nZn
= PKPSmJPSˆm|JPM |KJPUnV n|MPY nZn|V n
, 2−mRKPSmJ1{sˆm = Sˆm(j)}PM |KJ
1 {un = Un(m0), vn = V n(m)}
∏
PY Z|V . (233)
Furthermore, PKSmJMSˆmUnV nY nZn is intimately related to
the idealized distribution QKSmJMSˆmUnV nY nZn which is
defined in previous subsection.
Schieler and Cuff [2, Sec. VIII-B] showed that if Rt >
I(S; Sˆ), then
lim
m→∞EC
∥∥PSmJ −QSmJ∥∥TV = 0, (234)
where Rt given in (182) denotes the exponent of the size of
codebook. Using the property (4), we further have
lim
m→∞EC
∥∥PKSmJMSˆmUnV nY nZn −QKSmJMSˆmUnV nY nZn∥∥TV
= lim
m→∞EC
∥∥PSmJ −QSmJ∥∥TV = 0. (235)
Combine this with Theorem 7, utilize the property (3), and let
→ 0, then we have if RL ≤ min
{
RK +γΓ1
(
1
γ
(
I(S; Sˆ)
))
+
RS|Sˆ(DE), RS(DE)
}
, the cascaded encoder above satisfies
lim
m→∞ECZnM0
[
max
RmHcodes
P
[
dE(S
m, Sˇm) ≤ DE |CZnM0
]]
= 0. (236)
It implies that the wiretapper cannot decrypt source even when
both Zn and M0 are revealed to him. Hence as a weaker
version, he cannot decrypt source as well when only Zn
is revealed to him. This completes the proof of the secrecy
constraint.
To complete the proof of the achievability part, we now
show that the cascaded encoder above can achieve the dis-
tortion EdB(S, Sˆ) for the legitimate receiver. Instead of
considering the induced distribution PKSmJMSˆmUnV nY nZn
directly, we prove this holds under the desired distribution
QKSmJMSˆmUnV nY nZn . It is easy to verify that M is uni-
formly distributed under Q. Furthermore, the codebook is
randomly generated, and given M , the signal Y n follows∏n
i=1 PY |V (yi|vi(M)). It is well known that a good channel
decoder (e.g., joint typicality decoder) with respect to the
memoryless channel PY |V will drive the error probability to
zero as m goes to infinity, if Rt < γI (V ;Y ). That is
lim
m→∞ECPQ[Mˆ 6= M ] = 0. (237)
Then using the secret key, the legitimate user could recover J
with high probability. That is
lim
m→∞ECPQ[Jˆ 6= J ] = 0. (238)
Furthermore, (187) implies (Sm, Sˆm (J)) is an i.i.d sequence
under Q, hence by law of large numbers, we have for any
τ > 0,
lim
m→∞PQ
[
dB(S
m, Sˆm (J)) ≤ EdB(S, Sˆ) + τ
]
= 1. (239)
This implies under distribution Q, EdB(S, Sˆ) is achieved by
the legitimate user. Further, since the total variance between
Q and P vanishes as m → ∞, (239) also holds under the
distribution P . That is, the cascaded encoder above achieves
distortion EdB(S, Sˆ) for the legitimate user. This completes
the proof of R(i)sep.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Observe for any α > 0, any random variable X , and any
event A,
P (A) = EXP (A|X)
≥ EX [P (A|X) 1 {P (A|X) ≥ α}]
≥ αEX [1 {P (A|X) ≥ α}]
= αP [P (A|X) ≥ α] (240)
and
P (A) = EXP (A|X)
= EX [P (A|X) 1 {P (A|X) ≥ α}]
+ EX [P (A|X) 1 {P (A|X) < α}]
≤ EX [1 {P (A|X) ≥ α}]
+ αEX [1 {P (A|X) < α}]
≤ P [P (A|X) ≥ α] + α. (241)
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 12. For any α > 0, any random variable X , and any
event A, P (A)− α ≤ P [P (A|X) ≥ α] ≤ P(A)α .
Consider a sequence of random variables {Xn}, and a
sequence of events {An}. Applying the lemma above, we have
P (An)− τn ≤ P [P (An|Xn) ≥ τn] ≤ P (An)
τn
(242)
for any positive sequence {τn}. If limn→∞ P (An) = 0,
then from the fact that no a worst convergent series ex-
ists [26], we have there exists a sequence of real numbers
{τn} such that limn→∞ τn = 0 and limn→∞ P(An)τn =
0. Hence limn→∞ P [P (An|Xn) ≥ τn] = 0. On the other
hand, if limn→∞ P [P (An|Xn) ≥ τn] = 0 for some se-
quence τn with limn→∞ τn = 0, then limn→∞ P (An) ≤
limn→∞ {P [P (An|Xn) ≥ τn] + τn} = 0.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
By using a union bound,
PC (Bc)
≤ PC
[
max
(m0,mc,zn):(Un(m0),zn)∈T nδ′
φC (m0,mc, zn) > 22m
]
+ PC
[
min
(m0,mc,zn):(Un(m0),zn)∈T nδ′
φC (m0,mc, zn) < 1
]
.
(243)
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In the following, we prove that both the terms of (243)
vanish as m→∞. Observe
PC
[
max
(m0,mc,zn):(Un(m0),zn)∈T nδ′
φC (m0,mc, zn) > 22m
]
= EC0PC1
[
max
(m0,mc,zn):(Un(m0),zn)∈T nδ′
φC (m0,mc, zn) > 22m|C0
]
. (244)
Hence we only need to show the probability in (244) vanishes
for any C0 as m→∞. Using union bound, we have
PC1
[
max
(m0,mc,zn):(Un(m0),zn)∈T nδ′
φC (m0,mc, zn) > 22m|C0
]
≤ 2m(R0+Rc) |T nδ′ | max
(m0,mc,zn):(Un(m0),zn)∈T nδ′
PC1
[
φC (m0,mc, zn) > 22m|C0
]
(245)
Define θm′1 (z
n) , 1 {(Un (m0) , V n (m0,m′1,mc) , zn) ∈ T nδ },
then φC (m0,mc, zn) =
∑
m′1
θm′1 (z
n). Given
(m0,mc, z
n) and C0 such that (Un (m0) , zn) ∈ T nδ′ ,
θm′1 (z
n) ,m′1 ∈ [2mR
′
1 ] are i.i.d. random variables, with mean
EC1θm′1 (z
n)
= P
[
(Un (m0) , V
n (m0,m
′
1,mc) , z
n) ∈ T nδ |Un (m0)
]
= P
[
(Un, V n, zn) ∈ T nδ |Un
]
≤ 2−n(I(V ;Z|U)−δ), (246)
where δ tends to zero as δ → 0, and (246) follows from
the joint typicality lemma [17]. On the other hand, |T nδ′ | ≤
2n(H(Z)+δ′ ) for some δ′ that tends to zero as δ′ → 0. Hence
if we can show that the probability in (245) decays doubly
exponentially fast with m, then the proof will be complete. To
that end, we first introduce the following lemma on Chernoff
bounds.
Lemma 13. [2], [24] If X l is a sequence of i.i.d. Bern(p)
random variables, then for any k > 0,
P
[ l∑
i=1
Xi > k
]
≤
(
e·l·p
k
)k
, (247)
and for any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
P
[ l∑
i=1
Xi ≤ (1− δ)lp
]
≤ e− δ
2lp
2 . (248)
By identifying that
l = 2mR
′
1 (249)
p ≤ 2−n(I(V ;Z|U)−δ) (250)
k = 22m (251)
and applying Lemma 13, we have
PC1
[
φC (m0,mc, zn) > 22m|C0
] ≤ 2−mα2mβ , (252)
where
α = γI (V ;Z|U)− γδ −R′1 + 2 = − γδ, (253)
β = 2. (254)
For fixed  and sufficiently small δ, α > 0 and β > 0.
Hence (252) vanishes doubly exponentially fast. This means
that the first term of (243) vanishes as m→∞.
In the same way, by utilizing Lemma 13 again, we can
prove that for small enough δ, the second term of (243) also
vanishes as m→∞. This completes the proof of Lemma 7.
APPENDIX H
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Consider
P (M1 = m1, Zn = zn,M0 = m0,A3|C)
=2−mRtP (Zn = zn,A3|Un (m0) , V n (m0,m1))
≤2−mRt2−n(H(Z|V )−δ)
1 {(Un (m0) , V n (m0,m1) , zn) ∈ T nδ } , (255)
where (255) follows from the property of typical sequence
[17]: for any (vn, zn) ∈ T nδ ,
2−n(H(Z|V )+δ) ≤ P (Zn = zn|V n = vn) ≤ 2−n(H(Z|V )−δ),
(256)
with a term δ that vanishes as m→∞.
Similarly, we have
P (M1 = m1, Zn = zn,M0 = m0,A3|C)
≥2−mRt2−n(H(Z|V )+δ)
1 {(Un (m0) , V n (m0,m1) , zn) ∈ T nδ } . (257)
Therefore,
P (M1 = m1,A3|CZnM0)
=
P (M1 = m1, Zn = zn,M0 = m0,A3|C)∑
m1∈[2mR1 ] P (M1 = m1, Z
n = zn,M0 = m0|C)
≤ P (M1 = m1, Z
n = zn,M0 = m0,A3|C)∑
m1∈[2mR1 ] P (M1 = m1, Z
n = zn,M0 = m0,A3|C)
≤2
−m(R0+R1)2−n(H(Z|V )−δ)
2−m(R0+R1)2−n(H(Z|V )+δ)
× 1 {(U
n (m0) , V
n (m0,m1) , z
n) ∈ T nδ }∑
m1∈[2mR1 ] 1 {(Un (m0) , V n (m0,m1) , zn) ∈ T nδ }
≤ 2
2nδ1 {(Un (m0) , V n (m0,m1) , zn) ∈ T nδ }∑
m1∈[2mR1 ] 1 {(Un (m0) , V n (m0,m1) , zn) ∈ T nδ }
≤2−m(Rc−2γδ)1 {(Un (m0) , V n (m0,m1) , zn) ∈ T nδ } ,
(258)
where (258) follows from (199).
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF CONVERSE OF THEOREM 5
From source-channel coding theorem for Gaussian commu-
nication, we have γ2 log
(
1 + PNB
)
≥ 12 log+ NSDB . Besides,
similar to the discrete memoryless case, if RL > 12 log
+ NS
DE
,
then no matter what scheme Nodes A and B use, the henchman
and the wiretapper can ignore Zn altogether and simply use
a point-to-point rate-distortion code to describe Sm within
distortion DE (with probability 1). Hence we only need prove
21
RL ≤ RK + γ
2
log+
(
1 + P/NB
1 + P/NE
)
+
1
2
log+
DB
DE
. (259)
To that end, we follow similar steps to the proof of the
outer bound of Theorem 3. Since the admissible region of
(RK , RL, DB , DE) only depends on the margin distribution
of the wiretap channel, it is sufficient to consider the channel
to be physically degraded. Furthermore, observe that the
derivation up to (128) holds verbatim. Hence to complete the
proof, we only need to prove
I(Y; X|Z) ≤ 1
2
log+
(
1 + P/NB
1 + P/NE
)
, (260)
RS|Sˆ(DE) ≤
1
2
log+
DB
DE
. (261)
Actually, for physically degraded Gaussian wiretap channel
(as considered here), (260) was proven by Tan [18, Thm. 5].
Next we will show (261) also holds. From Theorem 1, it is
equivalent to showing that upon the two-sided information
Sˆm (within the distortion DB), there exists a source code
with rate 12 log
+ DB
DE
achieving the distortion DE with positive
probability. The corresponding part of the proof of Theorem
3 requires that the alphabet of the source or its reproduction
is finite, hence it cannot be applied to the case of continuous
alphabets, such as the Gaussian case. From the assumption,
Sm is in the balls of center Sˆm and radius
√
mDB with high
probability. Hence, we use a sphere covering lemma to prove
(261).
Lemma 14. [22], [23] Let R > 1 and let νR,l be the minimal
number of (closed) balls of radius 1 which can cover a (closed)
ball of radius R in Rl. If l ≥ 9, then we have
1 < νR,l ≤ 4eR
ll
√
l
ln l−2
(l ln l + l ln(ln l) + l lnR+ 12 ln(144l))
(262)
for all 1 < R < l2 ln l .
Observe that for any fixed R, 4eR
ll
√
l
ln l−2 (l ln l + l ln(ln l) +
l lnR+ 12 ln(144l)) = 2l(logR+o(1)). Hence from Lemma 14,
we can easily get that for large enough m, it suffices to cover
a ball of radius
√
mDB using 2
m
(
1
2 log
+ DB
DE
+o(1)
)
balls of
radius
√
mDE . This implies upon Sˆm, there exists a source
code with rate 12 log
+ DB
DE
achieving the distortion DE (with
high probability). Hence RS|Sˆ(DE) ≤ 12 log+ DBDE holds. This
completes the proof of the converse part.
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY OF THEOREM 5
The proof of R(i)sep of Theorem 3 requires that the alphabets
of the channel input and output, and the alphabets of the source
and its reproduction, are all finite, hence it cannot be applied
to the Gaussian case directly. Now, we prove the achievability
part for the Gaussian case by exploiting the techniques of
d−tilted information, weak typicality, and discretization.
A. Weak typicality and d−tilted information
Before proving the achievability part of Theorem 5, we need
introduce some preliminaries. To extend R(i)sep of Theorem 3
to the Gaussian case, we need to replace the strong typicality
(200) with weak typicality. The δ-typical set and the δ-
jointly-typical set are defined according to the notion of weak
typicality11, see [21]:
T nδ (X) ,{
xn ∈ Xn :
∣∣∣− 1
n
log
n∏
i=1
fX (xi)− h (X)
∣∣∣ ≤ δ
2
log e
}
,
and
T nδ (X,Z) ,{
(xn, zn) ∈ Xn ×Zn :∣∣∣− 1
n
log
n∏
i=1
fX (xi)− h (X)
∣∣∣ ≤ δ
2
log e,
∣∣∣− 1
n
log
n∏
i=1
fZ (zi)− h (Z)
∣∣∣ ≤ δ
2
log e,
∣∣∣− 1
n
log
n∏
i=1
fXZ (xi, zi)− h (XZ)
∣∣∣ ≤ δ
2
log e
}
,
For jointly Gaussian variables X and Z, where Z = X + U
and U is independent of X , the δ-typical set and the δ-jointly-
typical set become
T nδ (X) ,
{
xn ∈ Rn :
∣∣∣‖xn‖2
nNX
− 1
∣∣∣ ≤ δ}, (263)
and
T nδ (X,Z) ,
{
(xn, zn) ∈ R2n :
∣∣∣‖xn‖2
nNX
− 1
∣∣∣ ≤ δ,∣∣∣‖zn‖2
nNZ
− 1
∣∣∣ ≤ δ,∣∣∣‖xn‖2
nNX
+
‖zn − xn‖2
nNU
− 2
∣∣∣ ≤ δ}, (264)
respectively, where ‖xn‖ = √∑ni=1 x2i denotes Euclidean
norm of xn, and NZ , NX and NU denote the variances of
Z, X and U .
Similar to (26), the rate-distortion function for continuous
source is defined as
RS(D) = min
fSˇ|S :Ed(S,Sˇ)≤D
I(S; Sˇ). (265)
We impose the following basic restrictions on pdf fS and
the distortion measure d:
• Restriction 1: RS(D) is finite for some D, i.e. Dmin <
∞, where
Dmin = inf {D : RS(D) <∞} ; (266)
11For ease in writing, we replace δ with δ
2
log e in the definitions of δ-
typical set and the δ-jointly-typical set.
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• Restriction 2: The minimum in (265) is achieved by a
pdf fSˇ?|S , which is unique up to fSˇ?S-null sets, that is,
if gSˇ?|S is another pdf achieving the minimum in (265),
then fSˇ?|S = gSˇ?|S , fSˇ?S-almost everywhere.
Definition 9 (d−tilted information [27]). For D > Dmin, the
d−tilted information in s is defined as
S(s,D) , log
1
E
[
exp
(
λ?D − λ?d(s, Sˇ?))] , (267)
where the expectation is with respect to fSˇ? , i.e. the uncon-
ditional distribution of the reproduction random variable that
achieves the minimum in (265), and
λ? = −R′S(D). (268)
The following properties of d−tilted information, proven in
[28], are used in the sequel.
S(s,D) = ıS;Sˇ?(s; sˇ) + λ
?d(s, sˇ)− λ?D (269)
E[S(s,D)] = RS(D) (270)
E[exp (λ?D − λ?d(S, sˇ) + S(S,D))] ≤ 1 (271)
where (269) holds for fSˇ? -almost every sˇ, while (271) holds
for all sˇ ∈ Sˇ, and
ıS;Sˇ(s; sˇ) = log
fSˇ|S(sˇ|s)
fSˇ(sˇ)
(272)
denotes the information density of the joint distribution fSSˇ
at (s, sˇ) (c.f. (7)).
Similarly, we can define conditional d−tilted information
and prove the corresponding properties. Similar to (30), the
conditional rate-distortion function for continuous source is
defined as
RS|Sˆ(D) = min
fSˇ|SSˆ :Ed(S,Sˇ)≤D
I(S; Sˇ|Sˆ). (273)
Now we can establish the following lemma, the proof of which
is given in Appendix K.
Lemma 15. The minimization in (273) can be divided into
two optimization subproblems:
RS|Sˆ(D) = min
b(sˆ):ESˆ
[
b(Sˆ)
]
≤D
ESˆRS|Sˆ=sˆ(b(Sˆ)), (274)
where
RS|Sˆ=sˆ(β) = min
fSˇ|S,Sˆ=sˆ:E
[
d(S,Sˇ)|Sˆ=sˆ
]
≤β
I(S; Sˇ|Sˆ = sˆ) (275)
denotes the rate-distortion function of source S under con-
dition that Sˆ = sˆ. Moreover, assume b? (sˆ) achieves the
minimum in (274), and fSˇ?|S,Sˆ=sˆ achieves the minimum in
(275) with β = b? (sˆ), then fSˇ?|S,Sˆ minimizes (273) as well,
i.e., fSˇ?|S,Sˆ is a solution to the minimization in (273).
Similar to Restrictions 1 and 2, for conditional rate-
distortion function, we impose the following basic restrictions
on fSSˆ and the distortion measure:
• Restriction 3: For all sˆ ∈ Sˆ, RS|Sˆ=sˆ(β) is finite for some
β, i.e. βmin (sˆ) <∞, where
βmin (sˆ) = inf
{
β : RS|Sˆ=sˆ(β) <∞
}
; (276)
• Restriction 4: For all sˆ ∈ Sˆ, the minimum in (275)
is achieved by a pdf fSˇ?|S,Sˆ=sˆ which is unique up
to fSˇ?S|Sˆ=sˆ-null sets, that is, if gSˇ?|S,Sˆ=sˆ is another
pdf achieving the minimum in (26), then fSˇ?|S,Sˆ=sˆ =
gSˇ?|S,Sˆ=sˆ, fSˇ?S|Sˆ=sˆ-almost everywhere;
• Restriction 5: RS|Sˆ(D) is strictly decreasing in
(Dmin, Dmax) where
Dmin = inf
{
D : RS|Sˆ(D) <∞
}
(277)
and
Dmax = inf
{
D : RS|Sˆ(D) = 0
}
. (278)
Assume b? (sˆ) achieves the minimum in (274), and fSˇ?|S,Sˆ=sˆ
achieves the minimum in (275) with β = b? (sˆ), as assumed
in Lemma 15, then the following lemma holds. The proof is
given in Appendix L.
Lemma 16.
RS|Sˆ(D) = ESˆRS|Sˆ=sˆ(b
? (sˆ)), (279)
ESˆ
[
b?(Sˆ)
]
= D, (280)
E
[
d(S, Sˇ?)|Sˆ = sˆ] = b? (sˆ) , (281)
R′
S|Sˆ=sˆ(b
? (sˆ)) = −λ,∀sˆ ∈ Sˆ (282)
for some constant λ ≥ 0.
Definition 10 (Conditional d−tilted information). For
b? (sˆ) > βmin (sˆ), the conditional d−tilted information in s
under condition Sˆ = sˆ is defined as
S|Sˆ=sˆ(s, b
? (sˆ))
, log 1
ESˇ?|Sˆ=sˆ
[
exp
(
λ? (sˆ) b? (sˆ)− λ? (sˆ) d(s, Sˇ?))] ,
(283)
where the expectation is with respect to fSˇ?|Sˆ=sˆ, and
λ? (sˆ) = −R′
S|Sˆ=sˆ(b
? (sˆ)). (284)
Combining (282) and (284), we have for all sˆ,
λ? (sˆ) = λ. (285)
Obviously, the conditional d−tilted information for the dis-
tribution fS|Sˆ=sˆ and distortion b
? (sˆ) can be considered as
a special unconditional d−tilted information for fS′ and D′
such that fS′ = fS|Sˆ=sˆ and D
′ = b? (sˆ). Hence (269)-(271)
still hold for S|Sˆ=sˆ(s, b
? (sˆ)), i.e.,
S|Sˆ=sˆ(s, b
? (sˆ))
= ıS;Sˇ?|Sˆ=sˆ(s; sˇ) + λ
? (sˆ) d(s, sˇ)− λ? (sˆ) b? (sˆ) , (286)
ES|Sˆ=sˆ
[
S|Sˆ=sˆ(S, b
? (sˆ))
]
= RS|Sˆ=sˆ(b
? (sˆ)), (287)
ES|Sˆ=sˆ
[
exp
(
λ? (sˆ) b? (sˆ)− λ? (sˆ) d(S, sˇ) + S|Sˆ=sˆ(S, b? (sˆ))
)]
≤ 1, (288)
where (286) holds for fSˇ?|Sˆ=sˆ-almost every sˇ, while (288)
holds for all sˇ ∈ Sˇ, and
ıS;Sˇ?|Sˆ=sˆ(s; sˇ) = log
fSˇ|S,Sˆ=sˆ(sˇ|s)
fSˇ|Sˆ=sˆ(sˇ)
(289)
23
denotes the conditional information density of the joint distri-
bution fSSˇ|Sˆ=sˆ at (s, sˇ).
B. Subproblem: lossy compression of a codeword drawn uni-
formly from a random codebook with side information
Next we return to proving the achievability part of Theorem
5. We follow similar steps to that of the discrete memoryless
case. Consider the subproblem described in Appendix E-A
for the Gaussian source-channel case. Then we can prove
that Theorem 7 still holds. To show the achievability for
the Gaussian case, it is sufficient to consider the case of
U = ∅, V = X .
Theorem 8. Theorem 7 with U = ∅, V = X holds for
Gaussian communication case.
Proof of Theorem 8: Since dB (x, y) = dE (x, y) =
(x− y)2, in the following, we use d (x, y) to denote both
of them. Furthermore, for the memoryless Gaussian source
S, set Sˆ to be a jointly Gaussian variable with S such that
S = Sˆ+W , Sˆ and W are independent and E
[
W 2
]
= DB . It
is easy to verify that fSSˆ and d(s, sˇ) satisfy Restrictions 1-5.
Next we follow similar steps to the proof of R(i)sep of
Theorem 7, except for some modifications. First, we need to
replace the strong typicality (200) with the weak typicality,
since strong typicality only works for the variables with finite
alphabets. Second, we need re-define A1 as
A1 ,
{
Sm ∈ T mδ ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
S(Si, DE) ≥ RS(DE)− δ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
S|Sˆ=Sˆi(Si, b
?(Sˆi)) ≥ RS|Sˆ(DE)− δ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
b?(Sˆi) ≥ DE − δ
}
(290)
for δ > 0. A2,A3,A123,A23,B remain the same but restricted
to the case with U = ∅, V = X . Then we have following
lemmas, the proofs of which are given in Appendices M and
N, respectively.
Lemma 17. For Gaussian wiretap channel, limm→∞ P (B) =
1.
Lemma 18. For any stationary memoryless source fSSˆ
with general distortion function d(s, sˇ) satisfying Restric-
tions 1-5 (not restricted to the quadratic Gaussian case),
limm→∞ P (A123) = 1.
Re-define ηm,k,sˇm as
ηm,k,sˇm (DE) ,
∑
sm∈Sm
m∏
i=1
PS|Sˆ
(
si|Sˆi(j (m, k))
)
× 1
{
d(sm, sˇm) ≤ DE , sm ∈ T mδ ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
S(si, DE) ≥ RS(DE)− δ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
S|Sˆ=sˆi(si, b
?(sˆi)) ≥ RS|Sˆ(DE)− δ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
b?(sˆi) ≥ DE − δ
}
. (291)
Then the derivation up to (214) still holds, i.e.,
PCZnM0
[
max
RLcodes
P
[
d(Sm, Sˇm) ≤ DE
]
> τ
]
≤ PCZnM0
[
max
sˇm∈Rm,m′1∈[2mR
′
1 ]
2mRK∑
k=1
2mRc∑
mc=1
ηm,k,sˇm (DE) > τ
′2−mλ
′]
+ ′m, (292)
where ηm,k,sˇm (DE) is defined in (216). Now to take the
maximizing operation out of the probability in (292), we use a
discretization technology that is also used in proof of Lemma
17. Quantize sˇm as [sˇ]m ∈ Nm by the following manner,
where N is defined in (322).
[sˇi] = ∆ · Round
(
sˇi
∆
)
. (293)
Then similar to (328), we can prove
‖[sˇ]m − sm‖2
m
− ∆ ≤ ‖sˇ
m − sm‖2
m
≤ ‖[sˇ]
m − sm‖2
m
+ ∆ (294)
for some ∆ that vanishes as ∆→ 0. Hence
ηm,k,sˇm (DE) ≤ ηm,k,[sˇ]m (DE + ∆) . (295)
Define Fm ,
{
[sˇ]m ∈ Nm : ‖[sˇ]m‖2 ≤ mNS (1 + δ)
}
,
then we have
PCZnM0
[
max
RLcodes
P
[
d
(
Sm, Sˇm
) ≤ DE] > τ]
≤ PCZnM0
[
max
[sˇ]m∈Nm,m′1∈[2mR
′
1 ]
2mRK∑
k=1
2mRc∑
mc=1
ηm,k,[sˇ]m (DE + ∆) > τ
′2−mλ
′]
+ ′m (296)
= PCZnM0
[
max
[sˇ]m∈Fm,m′1∈[2mR
′
1 ]
2mRK∑
k=1
2mRc∑
mc=1
ηm,k,[sˇ]m (DE + ∆) > τ
′2−mλ
′]
+ ′m (297)
≤ 2mR′1 |Fm| max
[sˇ]m∈Fm,m′1∈[2mR
′
1 ]
PCZnM0
[ 2mRK∑
k=1
2mRc∑
mc=1
ηm,k,[sˇ]m (DE + ∆) > τ
′2−mλ
′]
+ ′m,
(298)
where (296) follows from (292) and (295), and (297) follows
from that sm belongs in the m-ball with radius mNS (1 + δ)
(since sm ∈ T mδ ), hence it suffices to use the points in the
ball as reconstructions.
Furthermore, similar to (336), we have
|Fm| ≤ 2m( 12 logm+o(logm)). (299)
Hence if we can show that the probability in (298) decays
doubly exponentially fast with m, then the proof will be
24
complete. To that end, we first introduce the following lemmas
which are related to Lemmas 9 and 10. The proof of Lemma
20 is given in Appendix O.
Lemma 19. [25, Thm. 4] If fS and d(s, sˇ) satisfy Restrictions
1 and 2, and Sm is i.i.d. according to fS , then for any sˆm ∈
Sˆm,
P
[
d(Sm, sˇm) ≤ DE , 1
m
m∑
i=1
S(Si, DE) ≥ RS(DE)− δ
]
≤ 2−m(RS(DE)−m,δ), (300)
where m,δ is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and m→∞.
Lemma 20. Fix fSSˆ and sˆ
m ∈ Sˆm. If fSSˆ and d(s, sˇ)
satisfy Restrictions 1-5, and Sm is distributed according to∏m
i=1 fS|Sˆ=sˆi , then for any sˇ
m,
P
[
d(Sm, sˇm) ≤ DE ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
S|Sˆ=sˆi(Si, b
?(sˆi)) ≥ RS|Sˆ(DE)− δ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
b?(sˆi) ≥ DE − δ|Sˆm = sˆm
]
≤ 2−m(RS|Sˆ(DE)−m,δ), (301)
where m,δ is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and m→∞.
Note that Lemmas 19 and 20 hold for any stationary mem-
oryless source with general distortion measure (not restricted
to the Gaussian source with quadratic distortion), and hence
they can be used to replace Lemmas 9 and 10 in the proof of
Theorem 7.
Apply Lemmas 11, 19 and 20, then we have the probabil-
ity in (298) decays doubly exponentially fast with m. This
completes the proof of Theorem 8.
C. Likelihood encoder
All the derivations in Appendix E-B still hold for the source
and channel with continuous alphabets. Hence the inner bound
R(i)sep (with U = ∅, V = X) still holds for the Gaussian
communication. It is easy to verify R(i)sep is just the region
of Theorem 5, hence the achievability of Theorem 5 holds.
APPENDIX K
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Proof of “≥”. Assume fSˇ′|SSˆ achieves the minimum
in (273) and define b′ (sˆ) = E
[
d(S, Sˇ′)|Sˆ = sˆ
]
, then
ESˆ′
[
b′
(
Sˆ′
)]
≤ D, and
RS|Sˆ(D) = I
(
S; Sˇ′|Sˆ
)
=
ˆ
dsˆf (sˆ) I
(
S; Sˇ′|Sˆ = sˆ
)
≥
ˆ
dsˆf (sˆ)
× min
fSˇ|S,Sˆ=sˆ:E[d(S,Sˇ)|Sˆ=sˆ]≤b′(sˆ)
I
(
S; Sˇ|Sˆ = sˆ
)
= ESˆRS|Sˆ=sˆ(b
′ (sˆ))
≥ min
b(sˆ):ESˆ[b(Sˆ)]≤D
ESˆRS|Sˆ=sˆ(b (sˆ)). (302)
Proof of “≤”. Observe that
min
b(sˆ):ESˆ[b(Sˆ)]≤D
ESˆRS|Sˆ=sˆ(b (sˆ))
= min
b(sˆ):ESˆ[b(Sˆ)]≤D
ˆ
dsˆf (sˆ)
× min
fSˇ|S,Sˆ=sˆ:E[d(S,Sˇ)|Sˆ=sˆ]≤b(sˆ)
I
(
S; Sˇ|Sˆ = sˆ
)
. (303)
Assume b′′ (sˆ) and fSˇ′′|S,Sˆ=sˆ achieves the minimum in (303).
Then we have
Ed
(
S, Sˇ′′
)
= ESˆE
[
d
(
S, Sˇ′′
) |Sˆ = sˆ] ≤ ESˆb′′ (Sˆ) ≤ D,
(304)
and
min
b(sˆ):ESˆ[b(Sˆ)]≤D
ESˆRS|Sˆ=sˆ(b (sˆ))
=
ˆ
dsˆf (sˆ) I
(
S; Sˇ′′|Sˆ = sˆ
)
(305)
= I
(
S; Sˇ′′|Sˆ
)
(306)
≥ min
fSˇ|SSˆ :Ed(S,Sˇ)≤D
I
(
S; Sˇ|Sˆ
)
(307)
= RS|Sˆ(D), (308)
where (307) follows from (304).
Combining (302) and (308) gives us
RS|Sˆ(D) = min
b(sˆ):ESˆ[b(Sˆ)]≤D
ESˆRS|Sˆ=sˆ(b (sˆ)). (309)
Furthermore, it is easy to verify that fSˇ′′|S,Sˆ=sˆ is also a
solution to the minimization in (273). Hence the lemma holds.
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Equation (279) follows straightforwardly by the assumption
that b? (sˆ) achieves the minimum in (274).
Furthermore, from the assumptions, we have
ESˆ
[
b?(Sˆ)
] ≤ D, (310)
and
E
[
d(S, Sˇ?)|Sˆ = sˆ] ≤ b? (sˆ) . (311)
25
Then we have
E
[
d(S, Sˇ?)
]
= ESˆE
[
d(S, Sˇ?)|Sˆ = sˆ] (312)
≤ ESˆb? (sˆ) (313)
≤ D, (314)
where (313) follows from (311), and (314) follows from (310).
Since RS|Sˆ(D) is strictly decreasing (Restriction 5),
RS|Sˆ(D) is achieved by some fSˇ|S,Sˆ only if E
[
d(S, Sˇ)
]
= D.
On the other hand, Lemma 15 tells us fSˇ?|S,Sˆ achieves
RS|Sˆ(D). Hence
E
[
d(S, Sˇ?)
]
= D. (315)
Combining (314) and (315) gives us
ESˆ
[
b?(Sˆ)
]
= D, (316)
E
[
d(S, Sˇ?)|Sˆ = sˆ] = b? (sˆ) . (317)
Furthermore, since RS|Sˆ=sˆ(·) is convex, minimizing (274)
is equivalent to minimizing its Lagrangian function, i.e.,
min
b(sˆ)
{
ESˆRS|Sˆ=sˆ(b (sˆ)) + λESˆ
[
b(Sˆ)
]}
, (318)
where λ ≥ 0 is a Lagrangian multiplier. By calculus of
variations, the solution to (318) or (274) satisfies the necessary
condition
f (sˆ)R′
S|Sˆ=sˆ(b (sˆ)) + λf (sˆ) = 0. (319)
That is
λ = −R′
S|Sˆ=sˆ(b (sˆ)). (320)
On the other hand, b? (sˆ) is assumed to be the solution to
(274), hence
λ = −R′
S|Sˆ=sˆ(b
? (sˆ)). (321)
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Before proving Lemma 17, we need introduce the discretiza-
tion of Euclidean space, and corresponding properties. Let
[Z] ∈ N , {· · · ,−2∆,−∆, 0,∆, 2∆, · · · } (322)
be a quantized version of Z, obtained by mapping Z to the
closest quantization point, i.e.,
[zi] = ∆ · Round
(zi
∆
)
. (323)
Then for any zn ∈ Rn,
0 ≤ ‖z
n − [z]n‖2
n
≤ ∆
2
4
. (324)
Furthermore, using triangle inequality we have
−‖z
n − [z]n‖2
n
≤ ‖z
n‖2
n
− ‖[z]
n‖2
n
≤ ‖z
n − [z]n‖2
n
.
(325)
Hence
−∆
2
4
≤ ‖z
n‖2
n
− ‖[z]
n‖2
n
≤ ∆
2
4
, (326)
i.e.,
‖[z]n‖2
nNZ
− ∆ ≤ ‖z
n‖2
nNZ
≤ ‖[z]
n‖2
nNZ
+ ∆ (327)
for some ∆ that vanishes as ∆→ 0. Similarly, it holds that
‖[z]n − xn‖2
nNE
− ∆ ≤ ‖z
n − xn‖2
nNE
≤ ‖[z]
n − xn‖2
nNE
+ ∆.
(328)
Therefore, combining (327) and (328), and according to def-
inition of weak typicality, we have if (xn, [z]n) ∈ T nδ−∆ ,
then (xn, zn) ∈ T nδ ; and in turn if (xn, zn) ∈ T nδ , then
(xn, [z]n) ∈ T nδ+∆ , where T nδ , T nδ−∆ and T nδ+∆ correspond
to jointly typical sets of (X,Z). This implies
1
{
(xn, [z]n) ∈ T nδ−∆
} ≤ 1 {(xn, zn) ∈ T nδ }
≤ 1{(xn, [z]n) ∈ T nδ+∆} . (329)
Now we start to prove Lemma 17. From (329), we have
(330) (given at the top of next page), where T nδ′+∆ corre-
sponds to a typical set of Z, and Fn , Nn ∩ T nδ′+∆ .
Using union bound we have
PC
[
max
mc∈[2mRc ],[z]n∈Fn∑
m′1
1
{
(Xn (mc,m
′
1) , [z]
n) ∈ T nδ+∆
}
> 22m
]
≤ 2mRc |Fn| max
mc∈[2mRc ],[z]n∈Fn
PC
(∑
m′1
1
{
(Xn (mc,m
′
1) , [z]
n) ∈ T nδ+∆
}
> 22m
)
.
(331)
Furthermore, |Fn| is upper-bounded by 2n( 12 logn+o(logn))
as shown in (336), and it is easy to verify that (246)-(254)
still hold for the Gaussian case. Hence the probability in (331)
decays doubly exponentially fast with n, which further means
(331) vanishes as m→∞.
Similarly, we can also prove
PC
[
min
mc∈[2mRc ],[z]n∈Fn∑
m′1
1
{
(Xn (mc,m
′
1) , [z]
n) ∈ T nδ−∆
}
< 1
]
→ 0,
(337)
as m→∞. Hence Lemma 17 holds.
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Similar to (187), for continuous random variables the fol-
lowing holds.
EC
[
QSmSˆm (s
m, sˆm)
]
=
m∏
i=1
fSSˆ(si, sˆi). (338)
Hence (Sm, Sˆm) is i.i.d. Since (weakly) typical set has total
probability close to one [21], we have
lim
m→∞P (S
m ∈ T mδ ) = 1. (339)
26
PC (Bc) ≤ PC
[
min
mc∈[2mRc ],[z]n∈T nδ′+∆
∑
m′1
1
{
(Xn (mc,m
′
1) , [z]
n) ∈ T nδ−∆
}
< 1,
or max
mc∈[2mRc ],[z]n∈T nδ′+∆
∑
m′1
1
{
(Xn (mc,m
′
1) , [z]
n) ∈ T nδ+∆
}
> 22m
]
= PC
[
min
mc∈[2mRc ],[z]n∈Fn
∑
m′1
1
{
(Xn (mc,m
′
1) , [z]
n) ∈ T nδ−∆
}
< 1
]
+ PC
[
max
mc∈[2mRc ],[z]n∈Fn
∑
m′1
1
{
(Xn (mc,m
′
1) , [z]
n) ∈ T nδ+∆
}
> 22m
]
, (330)
|Fn| ≤ Volume of n−ball with radius
√
nNZ (1 + δ′ + ∆) +
√
n∆2
∆n
(332)
=
pin/2
(√
nNZ (1 + δ′ + ∆) +
√
n∆2
)n
∆nΓ
(
n
2 + 1
) (333)
≤
pin/2
(√
nNZ (1 + δ′ + ∆) +
√
n∆2
)n
∆n
(334)
= 2
n
(
1
2 log pi−log ∆+log
(√
nNZ(1+δ′+∆)+
√
n∆2
))
(335)
≤ 2n( 12 logn+o(logn)). (336)
By the law of large numbers, we also have for any δ > 0,
lim
m→∞P
( 1
m
m∑
i=1
S(Si, DE) > ES(S,DE)− δ
)
= 1, (340)
lim
m→∞P
( 1
m
m∑
i=1
b?(Sˆi) ≥ ESˆ
[
b?(Sˆ)
]
− δ
)
= 1, (341)
and
lim
m→∞P
( 1
m
m∑
i=1
S|Sˆ=Sˆi(Si, b
?(Sˆi)) >
ESˆES [S|Sˆ=sˆ(S, b
? (sˆ))]− δ
)
= 1. (342)
Combining (340) with the property (270), we have
lim
m→∞P
( 1
m
m∑
i=1
S(Si, DE) > RS(DE)− δ
)
= 1. (343)
Combining (341) with (280) gives us
lim
m→∞P
( 1
m
m∑
i=1
b?(Sˆi) ≥ DE − δ
)
= 1. (344)
Furthermore,
ESˆES [S|Sˆ=sˆ(S, b
? (sˆ))] = ESˆRS|Sˆ=sˆ(b
? (sˆ)) (345)
= RS|Sˆ(DE), (346)
where (345) follows from (287), and (346) follows from (279).
Combining (342) with (346) gives
lim
m→∞P
( 1
m
m∑
i=1
S|Sˆ=Sˆi(Si, b
?(Sˆi))) > RS|Sˆ(DE)− δ
)
= 1.
(347)
(339), (343), (344) and (347) imply the lemma holds.
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Lemma 20 is proven in (348)-(352), where λ ≥ 0 is given
in (282) (or (285)), and (352) follows from (285) and the
property (288).
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